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Secession and Federalism in the 
United States: Tools for Managing 
Regional Conflict in a Pluralist 
Society 
This Article explores the use of federalism and secession as tools 
for managing regional conflict within pluralist governance, drawing 
on underappreciated features of the American experience. Epic 
struggles to balance autonomy with interdependence have taken on 
new urgency as dissatisfaction with globalization inspires political 
cataclysms unimaginable just a few years ago—including ‘Brexit’ 
from the European Union and American threats to leave NATO. The 
same impetus toward devolution also surfaces in heated intra-
national conflicts. Recent calls for secession in Catalonia, Iraqi 
Kurdistan, Scotland, Québec, South Sudan, and even from within the 
United States reveal multiple political contexts in which questions 
have been raised about how best to balance competing claims for 
autonomy, interdependence, political voice, and exit. 
As devolution movements destabilize institutions once thought 
impenetrably secure, scholars around the globe are tapping the 
wisdom of the Westphalian and post-Westphalian worlds to better 
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understand the available tools for managing these conflicts. In 
support of that goal, this Article probes the American experience for 
lessons on managing endemic tensions between autonomy and 
interdependence in societies composed of different regional, cultural, 
and ideological subcommunities. It explores American secession in 
contexts familiar and controversial, from the subnational to the 
national level, from the American Revolution to the Civil War and 
beyond. It assesses the unique advantages of U.S. federalism for 
mediating opposing forces of political entropy, which operate to pull 
the component pieces of pluralist nations apart, and political gravity, 
which pull them together in pursuit of common goals. 
Like all systems of federalism, the U.S. model cultivates the “sweet 
spot” between competing claims for local autonomy and national 
interdependence, allocating sovereign authority among levels of 
government where each best advances the overall goal. While the 
American model is not suitable in all contexts, the availability of 
nested political sites for regional expression, interjurisdictional 
innovation, and negotiated governance have helped fortify the 
American Union against the kinds of conflicts that can foment 
fragmentation. 
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INTRODUCTION: AUTONOMY AND INTERDEPENDENCE  
IN PLURALIST SOCIETY 
his Article explores the use of federalism and secession as tools 
for managing regional conflict in pluralist institutions of 
governance, drawing on underappreciated features of the historic and 
modern-day American experience. The struggle to balance competing 
claims for autonomy and interdependence in governance is epic, but it 
has taken on new urgency as waves of popular dissatisfaction with 
globalization inspire political cataclysms that would have been 
unimaginable just a few years ago. In 2016 alone, these included the 
British referendum to withdraw from the European Union1 and the 
election of Donald Trump to the U.S. Presidency on a platform of 
disengagement from such international federations as the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).2  
Yet the impetus toward devolution also surfaces in conflicts 
between competing intra-national constituencies, cleaving along 
regional, cultural, ethnic, religious, linguistic, and ideological lines. In 
the dominant circles of international law, secession is disfavored—
viewed as an extra-legal alternative that goes beyond the requirements 
of generally accepted principles of self-determination (at least absent 
gross violations, alien subjugation, international exploitation, or a 
colonial context).3 Nevertheless, recent calls for secession in 
Catalonia, Iraqi Kurdistan, Scotland, Québec, and South Sudan reveal 
multiple political contexts in which related questions are being raised 
 
1 Steven Erlanger, British Stun World with Vote to leave U.E., N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 
2016, at A1. 
2 Scott Bauer, Paul Ryan Defends NATO, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (July 26, 2016, 
1:40 PM), https://www.usnews.com/news/politics/articles/2016-07-26/in-break-from          
-trump-paul-ryan-defends-nato-trade-deals (discussing reactions to presidential candidate 
Donald Trump’s criticism of NATO, NAFTA, and the TPP). 
3 In re Secession of Québec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, 222 (Can.). The Supreme Court of 
Canada reviewed the dominant international law position on when secession is justified in 
its 1998 decision that Québec was not entitled to unilaterally secede—but that the rest of 
Canada must do more to resolve the grievances fomenting discontent in Québec. Id. 
(stating “a right to secession only arises under the principle of self-determination of people 
at international law where ‘a people’ is governed as part of a colonial empire; where ‘a 
people’ is subject to alien subjugation, domination or [international] exploitation; and 
possibly where ‘a people’ is denied any meaningful exercise of its right to self-
determination within the state of which it forms a part. In other circumstances, people are 
expected to achieve self-determination with the framework of their existing state.”). 
T
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about how best to balance competing claims for autonomy, 
interdependence, political voice, and exit.4 
In the United States, a genuine secession movement by the Alaskan 
Independence Party was judicially quelled as recently as 2010, 
highlighting the durability of the issue even in the modern United 
States.5 And while calls for full secession are seldom given much 
credence in the American political context, calls to further devolve 
regulatory authority occupy hallowed positions in major American 
political party platforms.6 Devolution claims, often framed in terms of 
“States’ Rights,” have become customary on the political right—but 
in the wake of the 2016 Presidential Election, they are increasingly 
heard on the left as well.7 A group of California citizens seeking their 
own independence from the United States have organized a “Calexit” 
campaign, seeking a 2019 referendum on California’s exit from the 
American Union.8 
 
4 See infra Part III. 
5 See infra notes 34–37 and accompanying text (discussing the Alaskan secession 
movement). 
6 See, e.g., Rayna Casey et al., A Rebirth of Constitutional Government, in REPUBLICAN 
PLATFORM 2016 9, 15–16 (Bill Gribbin & Eric Ueland eds., 2016), https://prod-cdn-static 
.gop.com/static/home/data/platform.pdf (pledging “to restore the proper balance and 
vertical separation of powers between the federal government and state governments—the 
governments closest to, and most reflective of, the American people. We encourage states 
to reinvigorate their traditional role as the laboratories of democracy, propelling the nation 
forward through local and state innovation.”). 
7 See Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Rites of Dissent: Notes on Nationalist Federalism, 59 ST. 
LOUIS U.L.J. 1133, 1143 (2015) (“Even the most extreme state-centric tools of federalism, 
secession and nullification, have been repurposed as tools of national partisan struggle in 
recent years.”); see also Charles C.W. Cooke, Post Election, Progressives are Embracing 
Conservative Traditions, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 13, 2016, 4:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com 
/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-cooke-left-embraces-conservatism-20161213-story.html (discussing 
progressives’ post-election embrace of federalism). 
8 YES CALIFORNIA’S CALEXIT BLUE BOOK: ANSWERS TO YOUR QUESTIONS ABOUT 
INDEPENDENCE, YESCALIFORNIA.ORG, https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/yescali 
fornia/pages/1/attachments/original/1482608371/Calexit_Book_1.1.pdf?1482608371 (last 
visited Oct. 13, 2017) [hereinafter CALEXIT BLUE BOOK]. The relationship of the Calexit 
movement to Russian interference in U.S. politics arose after Calexit’s early leader 
decided to move from California to Russia. Madison Park, Calexit Leader Quits Secession 
Effort to Make His Home in Russia, CNN (Apr. 19, 2017, 12:00 PM), http://edition 
.cnn.com/2017/04/19/politics/calexit-leader-russia/. However, the movement has 
continued in his wake, calling for a ballot initiative designed to “put California on the path 
towards becoming a fully-functioning sovereign and autonomous nation, whether within 
continued association with the United States of America, or as an independent country.” 
Jim Miller, Calexit Plan is Back, but It’s Toned Down, SACRAMENTO BEE (May 19, 2017, 
5:31 PM), http://www.sacbee.com/news/politics-government/capitol-alert/article1516598 
77.html (quoting the California ballot measure). 
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As secession and devolution movements threaten to destabilize 
federations once thought impenetrably secure—from the European 
Union to the United Kingdom to NATO—scholars around the globe 
are tapping the wisdom of the Westphalian and post-Westphalian 
worlds to better understand the available tools for managing regional 
governance conflicts.9 New scholarship exploring how different 
nations have managed these conflicts, some more and some less 
successfully, promises to broaden the perspectives of researchers, 
government officials, and citizens struggling to resolve sovereignty 
conflicts with full appreciation for the underlying principles they 
represent. 
In support of that goal, this Article shares the American experience 
of devolution conflict, probing our experiments with both federalism 
and secession for lessons on managing the endemic tension between 
impulses toward autonomy and interdependence in societies 
composed of different regional, cultural, and ideological sub-
communities. It explores secession in contexts both familiar and 
controversial, from the American Revolution through the Civil War, 
addressing secession at both the national and subnational levels. 
It also considers the development of American federalism, from a 
model emphasizing vertical separation toward one that harnesses 
inevitable jurisdictional overlap to cultivate opportunities for 
collaborative and competitive engagement. It assesses the unique 
advantages of American federalism for mediating the opposing forces 
of political entropy, which operate to pull the component pieces of 
pluralist nations apart, and political gravity, which pull them together 
in pursuit of common goals. It considers both the successes and limits 
of the American model, identifying those aspects that are instructive 
for governance elsewhere and those that may be inapplicable abroad. 
Finally, it reflects on the way that federalism can act as a double-
edged sword—or perhaps more accurately, a simultaneous sword and 
shield—providing a potential conduit for claims to secession at the 
same time that it functions as a safety valve to defuse the same 
impulses. 
Beginning with a historical account of secession in the United 
States, Part I reviews American secession movements at both the 
subnational and national level, with special focus on the paradigmatic 
 
9 See, e.g., 2 THE WAYS OF FEDERALISM IN WESTERN COUNTRIES AND THE HORIZONS 
OF TERRITORIAL AUTONOMY IN SPAIN (Alberto López Basaguren & Leire Escajedo San 
Epifanio eds., 2013) (international compendium of secession scholarship). 
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cases of the American Revolution and the American Civil War. Both 
examples demonstrate the deep regional tensions that can surface 
within a larger overall polity, reflecting the challenges of pluralist 
societies more generally. The southern states’ failed attempt to secede 
during the Civil War led to the formal disavowal of secession in the 
United States—leaving us to grapple with the meaning of what had 
already happened during the Revolutionary War, when the American 
colonies unilaterally separated from Great Britain. 
After considering the meaning of these wrenching moments in 
American history, Part II turns to our preferred means of mediating 
regional conflict, the institution of constitutional federalism. By 
dividing sovereign authority between local and national levels of 
government, federalism creates multiple simultaneous forums for 
political contest, competition, and collaboration that have diffused 
regional tension through engaged multilevel governance. Like all 
systems of federalism, the U.S. model cultivates the “sweet spot” 
between competing claims for local autonomy and national 
interdependence, allocating sovereign authority among levels of 
government where each best advances the overall goal. The 
availability of nested political sites for regional expression, 
interjurisdictional innovation, and negotiated governance have many 
benefits, including fortification of the American Union against the 
kinds of conflicts that might otherwise lead toward fragmentation. 
Part III acknowledges the aspirations and the limitations of the 
American model, and perhaps all federal systems, in coping with 
regional tension. Federalism offers useful tools for navigating the 
political forces of entropy and gravity that operate in all pluralist 
societies, but of course, it cannot solve all problems. This Part reflects 
on the challenges facing all federal unions, as well as the differences 
between the American model and alternatives that may better suit 
unions confronting more substantial regional diversity or entrenched 
regional conflict. The Article concludes with brief reflections about 
when secession is more and less justified, based on the relative 
strength of competing claims for autonomy and interdependence. 
I 
SECESSION IN THE UNITED STATES 
In the political context, “secession” refers to the circumstances by 
which a new sovereign territory is carved out of an existing sovereign 
territory, so that each continues thereafter as a separate political 
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entity.10 This meaning of the word did not take hold until well into 
the nineteenth century, after several such circumstances had arisen,11 
and it does not appear widely in the literature until the twentieth 
century. But with regard to that meaning, the U.S. model of secession 
initially appears straightforward. Consistent with the dominant stance 
on secession in international law,12 the formal American model can 
be summarized as: “no secession.”13 The U.S. Constitution includes 
no right of secession, the Supreme Court has conclusively disavowed 
it, and the United States has never recognized claims for secession 
from the overall Union as legitimate.14 Today, most Americans will 
live out their lives without ever seriously considering the possibility 
that the nation might cleave into parts.15 
Nevertheless, a scratch below the surface reveals that secession and 
the debates that surrounds it have played a vibrant role in American 
political culture throughout much of the nation’s history. It has done 
so at both the national level, where secession conflicts have been most 
conspicuous, and at the subnational level, where proposals for 
secession continue to this day. This section briefly reviews the 
American experience of subnational secession before taking on the 
weightier matters of national-level secession. 
 
10 See David Armitage, Secession and Civil War, in SECESSION AS AN INTERNATIONAL 
PHENOMENON 37–54 (Don H. Doyle ed., 2010); ALEKSANDAR PAVKOVIĆ & PETER 
RADAN, CREATING NEW STATES: THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SECESSION 5 (2007) 
(“Secession is the creation of a new state by the withdrawal of a territory and its 
population where that territory was previously part of an existing state”); Donald W. 
Livingston, The Very Idea of Secession, 35 SOC’Y 38, 45 (1998) (“Secession, however, is 
not revolution because it does not attempt to gain control of the government of a unitary 
state; rather it attempts to limit the jurisdiction of that government over the territory it 
occupies.”). But see Lea Brilmayer, Secession and Self-Determination: A Territorial 
Interpretation, 16 YALE J. INT’L L. 177 (1991) (discussing the difficulty in establishing a 
working definition of “secession” for U.N. purposes). 
11 See Livingston, supra note 10, at 38. 
12 See generally In re Secession of Québec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, 222 (Can.) (discussed 
supra note 3). 
13 See Texas v. White, 74 U.S. 700, 725 (1868) (holding that the union of states created 
by the American constitution is indestructible). 
14 Id. 
15 That said, the idea continues to surface. See, e.g., CALEXIT BLUE BOOK, supra note 
8; infra notes 34–37 and accompanying text (discussing the Alaskan independence 
movement. 
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A. Subnational Secession: Then and Now 
The Constitution may deny it at the national level, but secession 
has played a formative role in U.S. history at the subnational level. 
Prominent American states have subdivided into two, and municipal 
governments below the state level continue to divide and reconstitute 
as their citizens’ interests in autonomy and interdependence evolve. 
While most of the secession discourse presumes it as an exclusive 
feature of national level governance (regarding the creation of new 
nation states), the conversation about American secession rightly 
includes the subnational level, given the unique status of the 
American states within the U.S. system of constitutional federalism. 
Under the U.S. model of dual sovereignty, the fifty states possess 
their own sovereign authority to govern in realms of law that have not 
been enumerated to the national government.16 The source of state 
sovereign authority—the common law police power to regulate for 
the public welfare—exists separately from the authority conferred on 
the national government by the American Constitution, and it cannot 
be fully displaced by that national authority.17 Each state is thus a 
sovereign entity in ways that render them distinct from the regional 
subdivisions of a nonfederal nation. For that reason, when an 
American state splits in two, that process shares certain features with 
national-level secession, creating a new sovereign territory with 
powers distinct from both the original state and the central 
government. 
Indeed, states have subdivided on several notable occasions over 
American history, for reasons ranging from administrative concerns 
to avulsive political conflict. For example, North and South Carolina 
separated peacefully in 1712 due to the slow separation of interests 
over time, as their economic concerns grew increasingly 
differentiated.18 The Carolinas subdivided while still colonies of 
Britain, distinguishing their separation from true subnational 
secession within a federal system, but the new American states 
continued to subdivide as boundaries were solidified and new 
territories acquired. For example, several of the original American 
colonies had been granted territory extending from the Atlantic Ocean 
 
16 See, e.g., ERIN RYAN, FEDERALISM AND THE TUG OF WAR WITHIN 7–8 (2012) 
[hereinafter RYAN, TUG OF WAR]. 
17 Id. at 8–10. 
18 Creating the Carolinas, U.S. HISTORY (2016), http://www.ushistory.org/us/5c.asp 
(last visited Jan. 28, 2016). 
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to an undefined point westward—“from sea to sea”—and new states 
were created as boundaries were settled and the western territories 
became new states.19 
More dramatic movements for state-level secession took place on 
the eve of the American Civil War of the 1860s. Citizens in the 
mountainous regions of Tennessee and Virginia advocated for 
separation due to deep political discord over the positions taken by 
their states about slavery and national-level secession.20 In 1861, 
shortly after the state of Virginia joined the Confederate States in 
their effort to secede from the rest of the United States, the 
westernmost portion of the state succeeded in breaking off to form 
West Virginia.21 Notably, West Virginia became the only state to 
secede from the Confederacy in order to rejoin the United States, and 
it was admitted back into the Union as an independent state in 1863.22 
Subnational secession has also taken place for more prosaic 
administrative reasons, as in the case of the 1889 separation of North 
and South Dakota. The Dakotas split on the eve of statehood in order 
to break the oversized territory into smaller units, on the theory that 
smaller administrative chunks would be more amenable to good 
governance within the federal system.23 Nationwide, municipalities 
below the state level continue to form, dissolve, and separate for 
reasons of good public administration.24 However, new intrastate 
subdivisions remain subordinate to the full sovereign authority of the 
state, with much less regulatory independence than the states vis a vis 
 
19 See PAUL W. GATES, HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAND LAW DEVELOPMENT 49–52 (1968) 
(describing subdivision of the original western territories of Massachusetts, Connecticut, 
New York, Virginia, North and South Carolina, and Georgia). 
20 SCOTT REYNOLDS NELSON & CAROL SHERIFF, A PEOPLE AT WAR: CIVILIANS AND 
SOLDIERS IN AMERICA’S CIVIL WAR, 1854-1857 55 (2007) (“By the middle of 1861, in 
both Tennessee and Virginia, mountain politicians planned a secession of their own and 
sought to create two independent states: East Tennessee and West Virginia. The Virginia 
movement succeeded, partly because of support from the federal army. The newly formed 
United States Army of the Ohio, officered by Major General George McClellan, crossed 
the Ohio River into Virginia in May 1861.”). 
21 Id. 
22 West Virginia Statehood, W. VA. ARCHIVES & HIST. (2015), http://www.wvculture 
.org/history/archives/statehoo.html (last visited Oct. 14, 2017). 
23 See generally North Dakota and South Dakota Were Admitted to the Union 
November 2, 1889, AM’S STORY FROM AM’S LIBR., http://www.americaslibrary.gov/jb 
/gilded/jb_gilded_dakotas_1.html (last visited Oct. 14, 2017). 
24 See, e.g., Formation of Local Governments, FLA. STAT. § 165 (2005) (Florida statute 
governing the formation, dissolution, incorporation, and merger of municipalities). 
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the federal government (and for that reason, intrastate separation has 
less significance for the larger secession discourse). 
Since the separation of the Dakotas, the era of state-level secession 
in the United States has slowed down considerably, and as a practical 
matter, has probably ended. Nevertheless, the idea of subnational 
secession is still periodically raised in various U.S. political contexts. 
For example, there have been news-making proposals to break the 
state of California into “the Californias.”25 With some thirty million 
residents, California is the most heavily populated of all U.S. states, 
and its economy, if separated from the rest of the American economy, 
would be the sixth largest in the world.26 Proposals have ranged from 
dividing California into two, four, or even six separate states—usually 
to advance different regional interests in different parts of the large 
state.27 Some proposals to divide the state may also be designed to 
limit the jurisdiction of the influential Ninth Circuit Federal Court of 
Appeals, which is heavily influenced by litigation in southern 
California but binds judicial policy in many other western states.28 
Proposals to split California have been made as recently as 2011, but 
they have never gained much political traction, and success in the 
foreseeable future seems very unlikely.29 
The likelihood of national-level secession in the United States 
seems even lower, and yet even that idea is occasionally raised in the 
political sphere. For example, voices within the state of Texas semi-
 
25 Jennifer Chaussee, Billionaire’s Breakup Plan Would Chop California into Six 
States, REUTERS (July 14, 2014, 6:25 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-cali 
fornia-breakup-idUSKBN0FK03P20140715. 
26 California Passes France As World’s 6th-Largest Economy, FORTUNE (June 17, 
2016), http://fortune.com/2016/06/17/california-france-6th-largest-economy/. 
27 See Chaussee, supra note 25. 
28 See generally Eric J. Gribbin, California Split: A Plan to Divide the Ninth Circuit, 47 
DUKE L.J. 351 (1997) (stating that the connection between breaking up California in order 
to break up the Ninth Circuit hinges on the large volume of litigation generated in southern 
California in comparison with the rest of the circuit, combined with the desire to limit the 
precedential effect elsewhere of California-based Ninth Circuit decisions. The Ninth 
Circuit carries a very heavy load in comparison to other Circuits, but proposals to divide 
the Circuit by removing California have been unpersuasive, in part because southern 
California has historically generated more litigation than the rest of the Circuit combined. 
Creating a Thirteenth Circuit including only California would create a lopsided result, with 
an ongoing overload in the new Thirteenth Circuit and an unduly light load in the 
remaining Ninth Circuit. However, breaking California into pieces would enable the 
creation of a Thirteenth Circuit that includes only southern California, creating a more 
balanced judicial load while limiting the influence of those decisions elsewhere.). 
29 Daniel B. Wood, 51st State? Small Step Forward for Long-Shot ‘South California’ 
Plan, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (July 12, 2011), http://news.yahoo.com/51st-state-small    
-step-forward-long-shot-south-233234624.html. 
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regularly threaten to secede from the rest of the nation, often on the 
eve of a presidential or gubernatorial election.30 According to the 
usual script, a Texan public figure opines that Texas should secede 
from the Union if the federal government declines to adopt his or her 
policy preferences31—and the rest of the nation then performs its 
nonplussed response, generally with tongue-in-cheek applause, 
wishing Texas well on its way out.32 But apart from a few fireworks 
in the news cycle and on late-night comedy, nothing ever actually 
happens; it is mostly empty political theater, and everyone seems to 
know it.33 The theatrical public responses to Texan secession banter 
underscore the sense that, for all practical purposes, secession no 
longer seems like a viable option in U.S. political culture. 
In the early 2000s, however, a small but sincere secession 
movement arose in Alaska, where the Alaskan Independence Party 
secured one hundred signatures in support of a ballot referendum 
proposing Alaskan secession from the United States.34 The Alaska 
Independence Party seeks to establish Alaska as an independent 
nation, according to libertarian principles of limited governance, 
privatization, tax abolition, home schooling, and gun rights.35 The 
ballot initiative was rejected by the elections authority and ultimately 
the courts, on grounds that a ballot initiative cannot be certified for 
extraconstitutional purposes.36 As the Supreme Court of Alaska 
 
30 ‘Texas Secession’ Resolution to be Placed Before Texas GOP, NEWS RADIO 1200 
WOAI (Nov. 12, 2015, 11:00 AM), http://www.woai.com/articles/woai-local-news-spon 
sored-by-five-119078/texas-secession-resolution-to-be-placed-14117190/. 
31 See Alexander Mooney, Texas Governor Says Secession Possible, CNN (Apr. 16, 
2009, 11:56 AM), http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2009/04/16/texas-governor-says      
-secession-possible/ (discussing statements by Texas Governor Rick Perry declining to 
rule out the possibility that Texas may one day secede from the union). 
32 See, e.g., Shadee Ashtari, 10 Things We’d Lose if Texas Actually Seceded, HUFFPOST 
(Nov. 5, 2013, 6:05 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/11/05/texas-secede_n_421 
3506.html (suggesting, in jest, that America might be better off if Texas followed through 
on its threats to secede). 
33 See Peter Weber, What Would Happen if Texas Actually Seceded?, THE WEEK (Nov. 
26, 2012), http://theweek.com/articles/470115/what-happen-texas-actually-seceded 
(observing that secession talk is usually for the purpose of registering political 
disappointment, rather than to signal a genuine attempt at withdrawal). 
34 Kohlhaas v. State, 223 P.3d 105 (Alaska 2010). 
35 Alaskan Independence Party Platform, ALASKAN INDEP. PARTY, http://www.akip 
.org/platform.html (last visited Mar. 11, 2016). 
36 Kohlhaas, 223 P.3d at 111–13. 
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ultimately concluded in 2010, “secession from the Union is clearly 
unconstitutional.”37 
The unambiguous response to the Alaska initiative reinforces that 
the formal U.S. model of national-level secession remains: “no 
secession.” Here in the United States, goes the political wisdom, we 
simply don’t do secession—never will, never have. 
Or have we? 
B. The American Revolution 
Notwithstanding the unambiguous judicial message on national-
level secession, it may be that national secession actually has played 
an important role in American history—at the very beginning of the 
story, when the original thirteen colonies separated from the rest of 
the United Kingdom. The American Declaration of Independence of 
1776, claiming the right of the American colonies to separate from the 
rest of Britain as fully sovereign territories,38 has been recognized as 
“the first formal secession proclamation in world history.”39 In the 
Revolutionary War that followed, the colonies succeeded in 
establishing political independence, ultimately joining with one 
another to form the United States. 
Of course, most Americans think of these events not as secession, 
but as revolution (as the name suggests). And indeed, the American 
Revolution spawned a set of ideas that were revolutionary in every 
sense of the word: the written Constitution, the Bill of Rights, the 
institution of federalism itself—all were paradigm-shifting 
innovations in governance that have forever altered the path of the 
American experience, and arguably, that of the world.40 
 
37 Id. at 113. 
38 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 6 (U.S. 1776). 
39 Cf. Armitage, supra note 10, at 48. 
40 Cf. GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1992) 
(arguing that nevertheless, the interpretation of this historical period remains a subject of 
intense interest and contestation by historians, who have continued to debate the 
ideological roots of the American Revolution in the European Enlightenment, the 
remnants of feudal aristocracy in the early American experiment, and other interesting 
possibilities that go beyond the scope of this treatment). See, e.g., Bernard Bailyn, 
Political Experience and Enlightenment Ideas in Eighteenth-Century America, 67 AM. 
HIST. REV. 339, 341 & n.1 (1962) (listing other scholarly literature interpreting, disputing, 
and reinterpreting the intellectual history and ideological progeny of the American 
Revolution); Thomas C. Barrow, The American Revolution as a Colonial War for 
Independence, 25 WM. & MARY Q. 452 (1968) (grappling with the question of “just ‘how 
revolutionary’” was the American Revolution); ROBERT R. PALMER, THE AGE OF THE 
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Yet if we define “revolution” in existential terms as the full 
rejection of the pre-existing order,41 the answer to the question of 
what happened in 1776 is less clear. After all, if we set aside the 
ravages of the war itself and compare ordinary life in the times 
immediately before and after the Revolution, very little changed in 
most people’s day-to-day lives. The sovereign changed, but not much 
else. The relative continuity of the American experience is especially 
profound in comparison to other nations that have experienced truer 
revolutions—such as the Chinese Revolution in 1949, or the French 
Revolution in 1789—in which virtually all aspects of the pre-existing 
order really did change.42 
In this regard, comparing the American Revolution in 1776 and the 
nearly contemporaneous French Revolution in 1789 is informative. 
The American Revolution rejected British sovereignty, but it 
preserved a surprising degree of the rest of the existing order. The 
colonists rejected the British monarchy, but they preserved British 
common law and the common law system, which remains at the core 
of American law today.43 For the most part, they held on to the 
British system of property rights, and they protected those private 
property rights that had been previously recognized by the former 
British Crown (which had given very limited credence to the rights of 
indigenous inhabitants).44 The religious order, to the extent there was 
 
DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF EUROPE AND AMERICA, 1760-
1800 I (1959) (relating the American Revolution to European predecessors). 
41 See “Revolution,” MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, http://www.merriam-webster.com 
/dictionary/revolution (last visited Oct. 14, 2017) (defining revolution as “2a: a sudden 
radical or complete change b: a fundamental change in political organization . . . c: activity 
or movement designed to effect fundamental changes in the socioeconomic situation d: a 
fundamental change in the way of thinking about or visualizing something: a change of 
paradigm”). 
42 See generally FRANK DIKÖTTER, THE TRAGEDY OF LIBERATION: A HISTORY OF THE 
CHINESE REVOLUTION 1945-1957 (2013); CHRISTOPHER HIBBERT, THE DAYS OF THE 
FRENCH REVOLUTION (William Morrow & Company, Inc. 1980). 
43 See, e.g., LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, LAW IN AMERICA: A SHORT HISTORY 32 
(2002) (“The colonies won independence after a long war; but unlike say the French or the 
Russian revolutions, there was no sharp legal break with the past. The common law 
system (American style) remained intact. Indeed, in some sense, the aim of the Revolution 
was continuity, not overthrow: continuity of the colonial traditions, laws, and ways of 
life.”). 
44 See, e.g., Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823) (affirming American accession to 
British sovereign property, under the original principles of British law, and highlighting 
the unfortunate results for indigenous inhabitants). See generally JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER 
ET AL., PROPERTY LAW: RULES POLICIES, AND PRACTICES (6th ed. 2014) (identifying the 
roots of various American common law doctrines in British common law). 
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one, was unchanged before and after the revolution, and pre-existing 
social relationships were largely maintained.45 
By contrast, the French Revolution changed nearly everything 
about the status quo.46 Like the American Revolution, the French 
Revolution advanced new ideologies of liberalism, secularism, and 
human rights that would forever change the world.47 But in addition 
to these revolutionary ideas, the French experienced revolution in 
virtually every aspect of public life. Not only was the monarch 
removed from power, the entire political and social order was 
transformed. Feudalism was abolished, and the property and 
privileges of the nobility were attacked.48 The religious hierarchy was 
overthrown, and political power was massively shifted from the 
Church to the secular state.49 Women marched on Versailles to 
protest widespread poverty.50 Laws were rewritten, debt was 
forgiven, and divorce legalized.51 Even the Roman calendar was 
rejected after the French Revolution, in favor of a new calendar 
beginning at the year zero, to honor the nation’s new start.52 
Perhaps most powerfully illustrating the point, after the French 
Revolution, King Louis XVI was beheaded.53 After the American 
 
45 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 43, at 32. 
46 See generally 2 THOMAS CARLYLE, THE FRENCH REVOLUTION: A HISTORY (1867). 
47 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A BRIEF DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 
7–12 (Lynn Hunt ed. & trans., Bedford Books of St. Martin’s Press 1996). 
48 JOHN HALL STEWART, A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 
107 (The MacMillan Company 1961). 
49 PETER MCPHEE, FRENCH REVOLUTION 1789–1799 199 (2002) (noting that “[t]he 
Revolution had created a secular state; although the Restoration was to pronounce 
Catholicism the state religion, an important legacy of the Revolution was the creation of an 
ethos among public functionaries that their primary allegiance was to the ideal of a secular 
state which transcended particular interests. Never again could the Catholic Church claim 
pre-revolutionary levels of obedience or acceptance among the people.”). 
50 ALBERT SOBOUL, THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 1787–1799: FROM THE STORMING OF 
THE BASTILLE TO NAPOLEON 156 (Alan Forrest & Colin Jones trans., Random House 
1974). 
51 WILLIAM DOYLE, THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 121 (3d ed. 
1990). 
52 MATTHEW SHAW, TIME AND THE FRENCH REVOLUTION: THE REPUBLICAN 
CALENDAR, 1789–YEAR XIV 1 (2011) (“Together with reshaping the political world, the 
Revolutionaries endeavored to define the republican age with a new system of days, 
months and years, commemorating the nation’s achievements and laying the groundwork 
for a new future, free from the delusions of the past.”). 
53 HILAIRE BELLOC, THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 124 (1911). 
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Revolution, King George III of England continued to reign over the 
British Empire—just not the American colonies.54 
Thus, if we understand revolution as a full rejection of the existing 
order, and not just a political parting of the ways—then the American 
Revolution seems a surprisingly weak candidate. But if the American 
Revolution wasn’t a real revolution, what else could it have been? 
One answer, although lawyers and legal academics rarely talk about it 
this way, is that we might understand the American Revolution as 
something more akin to secession. 
Little in the legal discourse supports this view—no doubt because 
the courts have so flatly denied the possibility—but political theorists 
and historians have long debated whether the means by which the 
American colonies accomplished their independence should be 
viewed more as secession or revolution. The discourse has roots in the 
period of the Revolution itself, evident in the contrasting reflections 
of contemporaneous commentators like Thomas Paine,55 Edmund 
Burke,56 and Thomas Jefferson.57 These figures fell along a spectrum 
between extremes, in which Paine saw himself as fomenting 
revolution,58 Burke defended the American Revolution as sensibly 
constrained in contrast to full-out Revolution,59 and Thomas Jefferson 
moved over time from advocating reform from within the British 
Empire toward genuine revolutionary zeal.60 Debate over how best to 
characterize what happened then continues just as fervently into 
modern times.61 
 
54 George III (r. 1760–1820), THE ROYAL FAMILY, https://www.royal.uk/george-iii-r    
-1760-1820 (last visited Oct. 14, 2017). 
55 See THOMAS PAINE, COMMON SENSE (1776) (championing the idea of full American 
independence from Britain). 
56 See EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION OF FRANCE (J.C.D. Clark 
ed., Stanford Univ. Press, 2001). 
57 See generally DAVID N. MAYER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL THOUGHT OF THOMAS 
JEFFERSON (1994). 
58 PAINE, supra note 55, at 68 (“The laying a country desolate with fire and sword, 
declaring war against the natural rights of all mankind, and extirpating the defenders 
thereof from the face of the earth, is the concern of every man to whom nature hath given 
the power of feeling . . . .”). 
59 See BURKE, supra note 56 (contrasting the worthiness of the restrained campaign for 
American independence from Britain with the disastrous chaos of the French Revolution). 
60 MAYER, supra note 57, at 25–30 (reviewing the transformation of Jefferson’s ideas 
from support for “British America” to support for American independence). 
61 See generally Daniel McCarthy, Was the American Revolution Secessionist?, AM. 
CONSERVATIVE (Oct. 5, 2014, 5:03 PM), http://www.theamericanconservative.com 
/mccarthy/was-the-american-revolution-secessionist/. Cf. Brooks D. Simpson, The 
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Today, many scholars hold fast to the idea that the American 
Revolution was not just revolutionary,62 but radical.63 For example, 
historian Gordon Wood characterizes the Revolution as one “as 
radical and social as any revolution in history” because, in destroying 
the monarchy, the colonists set in motion a change that would 
fundamentally redefine society—albeit in a process that would take 
decades to fully unfold.64 By the early nineteenth century, however, 
he argues that “American society had been radically and thoroughly 
transformed,” noting such examples as the destruction of the 
aristocracy and the advancing position of women.65 “One class did 
not overthrow another; the poor did not supplant the rich[,]” he notes, 
“[b]ut social relationships—the way people were connected to 
another—were changed, and decisively so.”66 Framing the Revolution 
in these dramatic but favorable terms is consistent with the cultural 
origin story that most Americans hold dear. 
Others, including conservative icon Russel Kirk and his followers, 
prefer to cast the American Revolution in much more moderate terms, 
contrasting the worthy American movement with (what they 
considered) the undesirable chaos of revolutionary France.67 Drawing 
on the reflections of Edmund Burke, Kirk specifically characterizes 
what happened in 1776 as “a revolution not made but prevented.”68 
Conservative philosopher Donald Livingston similarly defends the 
Revolution as a “secession,”69 in direct contrast to the comparatively 
distasteful concept of revolution: 
Secession is often confused with revolution and civil war. The latter 
two presuppose the modern unitary state. Lockean revolution is an 
attempt to overthrow the government of a unitary state that has 
 
American Revolution . . . Not the American Secession, CROSSROADS (Oct. 11, 2012), 
https://cwcrossroads.wordpress.com/2012/10/11/the-american-revolution-not-the-american 
-secession/. 
62 See, e.g., CRANE BRINTON, THE ANATOMY OF REVOLUTION (1952). 
63 See generally WOOD, supra note 40. 
64 Id. at 5. 
65 Id. at 6, 8. 
66 Id. at 6. 
67 RUSSELL KIRK, THE CONSERVATIVE CONSTITUTION (1990) [hereinafter KIRK, 
CONSERVATIVE CONSTITUTION] (explaining why the American Revolution should not be 
seen as a revolution according to the modern meaning of the word); RUSSELL KIRK, 
PROSPECTS FOR CONSERVATIVES 28–39 (1956) [hereinafter KIRK, PROSPECTS FOR 
CONSERVATIVES] (discussing the American Revolution as a conservative endeavor). 
68 KIRK, CONSERVATIVE CONSTITUTION, supra note 67, at 19 (grounding his analysis 
in the contemporaneous account of Edmund Burke). 
69 See, e.g., Livingston, supra note 10, at 40–42. 
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violated its trust. Secession, however, is not revolution because it 
does not attempt to gain control of the government of a unitary 
state; rather it attempts to limit the jurisdiction of that government 
over the territory it occupies. This is a serious matter, but it is not 
revolution. Its name is “secession.” And the sort of arguments that 
would justify secession are categorically distinct from the 
arguments that would justify revolution.70 
It may be that characterizing the American Revolution as a 
secession appeals to conservative thinkers of subsequent times71 
because that better aligns this iconic moment of American history 
with the principles of conservative political theory. Broadly speaking, 
conservative theorists prefer the maintenance of order to abrupt and 
destabilizing changes.72 For them, framing the American Revolution 
as a secession enables a much more favorable view of the 
protagonists of the Revolution, George Washington and his 
contemporaries. For example, Russel Kirk has argued at length that 
the American Revolution was a conservative endeavor to protect the 
rights of English subjects, and that the “founding fathers” embodied 
the essence of conservativism.73 Perhaps characterizing the founding 
fathers of the nation as noble, conservative heroes who changed the 
minimum possible to achieve the necessary goal of independence is 
more appealing than associating them with a more revolutionary 
framework, in which they might be viewed as less honorable freedom 
-fighting terrorists. 
Still others recognize the possibility that the Revolution resists 
categorization because it was more than one thing at a time. For 
example, Professor David Armitage considers the possibilities for 
 
70 Id. at 45. 
71 Of course, the most conservative thinkers at the time of the actual Revolution were 
probably the Tories—English loyalists who returned to England or fled to Canada—who 
took a decidedly different view of the Revolution. See, e.g., THOMAS B. ALLEN, TORIES: 
FIGHTING FOR THE KING IN AMERICA’S FIRST CIVIL WAR (2010). 
72 Cf. KIRK, PROSPECTS FOR CONSERVATIVES, supra note 67, at 38–39 (defining 
conservatism to include a preference for order and deep respect for the past, and “[a] 
prejudice against sudden change, a feeling that it is unwise to break radically with political 
prescription, an inclination to tolerate what abuses may exist in present institutions out of a 
practical acquaintance with the violent and unpredictable nature of doctrinaire reform.”); 
see also William F. Buckley Jr., Our Mission Statement, NAT’L REV. (Nov. 19, 1955, 8:00 
AM), http://www.nationalreview.com/article/223549/our-mission-statement-william-f       
-buckley-jr (noting that the journal of conservative thought “stands athwart history, yelling 
Stop, at a time when no one is inclined to do so, or to have much patience with those who 
so urge it”). 
73 See KIRK, PROSPECTS FOR CONSERVATIVES, supra note 67, at 28–39 (discussing the 
American Revolution at length). 
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characterizing the American Revolution as a rebellion, a secession, 
and a civil war—concluding that it was both a civil war and a 
secession, with the Declaration of Independence as its pivotal act.74 
We ordinarily understand secession to involve one polity breaking off 
from another, with no requirement for a change in the form of 
governance, whereas a revolution implies a dramatic change in 
governance but says nothing about breaking off. By this logic, France 
could only have experienced a revolution, while the United States 
might have experienced both. 
And yet still others see the American Revolution as a species 
within the larger genus of anticolonial political movements, with 
independent justification that effectively distinguishes them from all 
other categories.75 To this end, Thomas Barrow argues that “colonial 
wars for independence or ‘liberation’ are generally different from 
revolutions of the French or Russian variety,” with an “inner logic of 
their own,” concluding that “after all, the American Revolution was 
just that—a colonial war for liberation.”76 
In fact, many political theorists resist the characterization of the 
American Revolution as a secession for exactly this reason. For them, 
a critical component of the analysis is the overarching political 
context in which the early American conflict unfolded: that of 
European imperialism.77 These scholars view secession as something 
like a political divorce—a separation that happens between parties of 
relatively equal political standing. But the power dynamics in 
imperial relationships are different from those between competing 
parts of a single polity, such as those between the joined territories 
that would later divide into Norway and Sweden, or Slovakia and the 
Czech Republic. By this view, the wresting of independence by a 
colony from an imperial power is an inherently revolutionary act.78 
 
74 Armitage, supra note 10, at 47. 
75 See, e.g., Barrow, supra note 40, at 454 (arguing that the American Revolution was a 
colonial war for liberation, and noting that “[c]olonial wars for independence have an 
inner logic of their own”); see also LOUIS HARTZ, THE FOUNDING OF NEW SOCIETIES: 
STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES, LATIN AMERICA, SOUTH AFRICA, 
CANADA, AND AUSTRALIA (1969) (analyzing the American Revolution through his 
theoretical inquiry into the process of postcolonial development and in terms of 
“fragmentation” from European traditions). 
76 Barrow, supra note 40, at 454. 
77 See, e.g., Simpson, supra note 61. 
78 See, e.g., Bernard Bailyn, Political Experience and Enlightenment Ideas in 
Eighteenth-Century America, 67 AM. HIST. REV. 339 (1962); cf. PAULINE MAIER, FROM 
RESISTANCE TO REVOLUTION: COLONIAL RADICALS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
AMERICAN OPPOSITION TO BRITAIN, 1765–1776 (1991). 
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When a colony throws off the yoke of dominant imperial power, goes 
this wisdom, it is making revolution. Accordingly, framing the 
American Revolution as a secession elides the political dynamics 
underlying the significance of the change.79 
Some who reject the secession theory of the American Revolution 
are also suspicious of its strategic use by those hoping to justify the 
attempt at secession to which we turn next—that by the southern 
states over national conflicts involving the institution of slavery. The 
concern is that characterizing the favorably-viewed American 
Revolution as a secession from Britain confers legitimacy on the later 
attempt by the Confederate states to secede from the Union80—an 
attempt that, by most contemporary perspectives, wants for 
legitimacy.81 
In the end, of course, much of this debate is over semantics: 
everything in it hinges on how we define “secession” and 
“revolution,” and work like Armitage’s reminds us that it is entirely 
possible to understand the American origin story as an example of 
both. Perhaps the Declaration of Independence was a secessionist act, 
creating an American independence in theory that was ultimately 
consummated by revolution. Today, the debate is rhetorical at most, 
but ironic nonetheless—in that a nation that has so clearly concluded 
that secession is constitutionally unavailable may have, itself, been 
conceived in secession. In the end, perhaps all we can do is consider 
whether the anticolonial movement that resulted in what we call the 
“American Revolution” also had an underappreciated secessionist 
element. 
Either way, it is interesting to note the strong emotional valance 
that seems to attend the vocabulary we use to describe our national 
origins. For some Americans, on both sides of the issue, whether this 
aspect of American history is framed as a secession or a revolution 
appears to make an identity-implicating difference. (And this almost 
certainly tells us more about ourselves than it tells us about anything 
in the historical record.) 
 
79 See Barrow, supra note 40, at 454. 
80 See, e.g., Livingston, supra note 10, at 45 (characterizing the American Civil War 
not as a civil war but as an act of secession, and comparing it in kind to the American 
Revolution). 
81 See, e.g., Simpson, supra note 61 (critiquing efforts to legitimize the Civil War, or 
other modern attempts at secession, by characterizing the American Revolution as a 
secession). 
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C. The American Civil War 
We now turn to the more obvious, and perhaps the more important 
moment in American history that implicates secession: the American 
Civil War.82 In the early 1860s, the southern states attempted to 
withdraw from the United States to form a separate nation, resulting 
in the bloodiest war ever fought on U.S. territory.83 The Civil War 
represents the fulmination of a conflict between northern and southern 
states that had been brewing since the beginning of the nation’s 
history over the institution of slavery. The southern states had 
developed agricultural economies that hinged on forced labor by 
slaves imported from Africa and their progeny, born domestically and 
held in captivity.84 Most northern states did not use slave labor, and 
many northerners had urged the end of slavery since the 
Revolutionary era.85 
While the northern and southern states were united in their effort to 
achieve independence from Britain, they remained divided over the 
role of slavery in the new United States. The dispute could not be 
reconciled at the Constitutional Conventions, and evidence of the 
ongoing conflict mars the original American Constitution.86 Mixed 
messages about the legitimacy of slavery can be found in various 
parts of the early text. The Preamble promises the blessings of justice 
and liberty for all,87 but these promises were clearly not intended for 
 
82 For a modern intellectual history of the Confederate secession movement, see Alison 
L. LaCroix, Continuity in Secession: The Case of the Confederate Constitution (U. Chi., 
Working Paper No. 512, 2015); see also Armitage, supra note 10, at 46 (noting that the 
American Civil War may have been more of a rebellion than a civil war, because the 
Confederacy sought sovereignty only over its own territory, and not the nation as a whole). 
83 See generally THE U.S. MILITARY ACADEMY, THE WEST POINT HISTORY OF THE 
CIVIL WAR 28–29 (Clifford J. Rogers et al. eds., 2014). 
84 See, e.g., Drew Gilpin Faust, The Rhetoric and Ritual of Agriculture in Antebellum 
South Carolina, 45 J.S. HIST. 541, 544–58 (1979) (“By the early nineteenth century the 
South had thoroughly committed itself to an economic, social, and racial order based on 
profitable staple-crop agriculture carried out by a labor force of black slaves.”); Peter 
Kolchin, Reevaluating the Antebellum Slave Community: A Comparative Perspective, 70 
J. AM. HIST. 579, 587 (1983) (discussing the shifting American slave population from 
imported persons to those born into captivity). 
85 See, e.g., William G. Shade, Antislavery, in 1 DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN HISTORY 
208 (Stanley I. Kutler ed., 3d ed. 2003). 
86 See infra notes 87−91 and accompanying text. 
87 See U.S. CONST. pmbl. (“We the People of the United States, in Order to form a 
more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the 
common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to 
ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States 
of America.”). 
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those held in bondage (nor, until much later, for women, indigenous 
people, and others).88 Slavery was not expressly permitted by the 
original Constitution, but neither was it prohibited—and the 
institution of slavery was implicitly legitimized by a number of 
clauses acknowledging it as a constituent part of American society. 
For example, the original Constitution included the now notorious 
“Three-Fifths Clause,” which clarified that slaves would be counted 
as three-fifths the value of free persons (excluding Indians) for the 
purpose of legislative districting.89 The Constitution allowed 
Congress to ban the slave trade after 1808, reflecting the preferences 
of the northern states.90 But reflecting the preferences of the southern 
states, the same clause expressly allowed the slave trade at least until 
then, and it implicitly allowed the continued use of domestically born 
slaves thereafter. The early Constitution also mandated the return of 
fugitive slaves to their owners,91 a point that would particularly 
inflame relations between northern abolitionists and southern 
slaveholders in the coming years. 
Unresolved tensions over slavery simmered for almost a century 
until they finally boiled over on the eve of the Civil War. Regional 
conflict intensified as the United States extended westward, and the 
north and south clashed over whether the practice of slavery would be 
permitted in new states.92 After heated debate in Congress, a 
legislative compromise was enacted in 1820—the Missouri 
Compromise—that would allow slavery to continue in the south, but 
 
88 See U.S. CONST. amends. XIII–XV. Nonwhites did not gain equal liberties with 
whites until the passage of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments, ratified 
in 1865, 1868, and 1870, respectively. See id. Women were granted voting rights by the 
Nineteenth Amendment, ratified in 1920. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX. 
89 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (“Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned 
among the several States . . . according to their respective Numbers, which shall be 
determined by adding to the whole Number of free Persons, including those bound to 
Service for a Term of Years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other 
Persons.”) (emphasis added). 
90 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1 (“The Migration or Importation of such Persons as any 
of the States now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the 
Congress prior to the Year one thousand eight hundred and eight . . . .”). 
91 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3 (“No Person held to Service or Labour in one State, 
under the Laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in Consequence of any Law or 
Regulation therein, be discharged from such Service or Labour, but shall be delivered up 
on Claim of the Party to whom such Service or Labour may be due.”). 
92 E.g., SUSAN DIXON, THE TRUE HISTORY OF THE MISSOURI COMPROMISE AND ITS 
REPEAL (1898). 
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prohibit its expansion into new American states north of Texas.93 
However, a subsequent law passed in 1854 allowed slavery in any 
state that approved it by popular vote, sparking outrage among 
abolitionists.94 Fugitive Slave Acts were enacted to criminalize 
assistance given to slaves escaping into free states, further enraging 
abolitionists.95 In frustration over these and other conflicts, southern 
states experimented with acts of nullification—declaring that they 
would no longer consider themselves bound under the Constitution’s 
Supremacy Clause to federal laws with which they disagreed.96 
In 1860 and 1861, the southern states finally decided to withdraw 
from the United States to form a separate union, the Confederate 
States of America.97 Territorial referenda were taken in Texas, 
Tennessee, Virginia, and Arkansas, each declaring victory for 
secession. The balloting in each state suffered from problems of fraud 
and intimidation that call into question the legitimacy of their 
results,98 but they still may have reflected a majority view among the 
voting population. 
 
93 Missouri Compromise, ch. 22, 3 Stat. 545, 548 (1820); see also DIXON, supra note 
92, at 54. 
94 Kansas-Nebraska Act, ch. 59, 10 Stat. 277, 289 (1854). The 1854 Kansas-Nebraska 
Act admitted Kansas and Nebraska as slave-states notwithstanding the Missouri 
Compromise, invalidating the earlier law and allowing new states to become slave-holding 
by popular vote. Id. 
95 See, e.g., Act of Sept. 18, 1850, ch. 60, 9 Stat. 462 (1850) (“An Act To amend, and 
supplementary to, the Act entitled An Act respecting Fugitives from Justice, and Persons 
escaping from the service of their Masters, approved February twelfth, one thousand seven 
hundred and ninety-three.”). 
96 See, e.g., South Carolina Ordinance of Nullification, November 24, 1832, YALE L. 
SCH., http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/ordnull.asp (last visited Oct. 14, 2017) 
(declaring that certain laws imposing duties on the importation of foreign commodities 
were constitutionally unauthorized and therefore “null, void, and no law, nor binding upon 
this State”). Non-slavery related justifications for southern secession (like these) have also 
been posed, including southern resentment over the 1861 Morrill Tariff, which conferred 
special protections for infant industries in the North. See id. Tariffs provoking southern ire 
did lead to the nullification crisis of the 1830s, but they are not among the grievances 
listed in the Confederate States’ declarations of secession, which center squarely on 
slavery. See id. Some scholars suggest that the tariff grievance has been used 
opportunistically as a post hoc justification for secession, emphasizing that it is not 
supported by historical evidence. See, e.g., MARC-WILLIAM PALEN, Debunking the Civil 
War Tariff Myth, IMPERIAL & GLOBAL FORUM (Mar. 2, 2015), http://imperialglobalexeter 
.com/2015/03/02/debunking-the-civil-war-tariff-myth/. 
97 THE UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY, supra note 83, at 28–29. 
98 See, e.g., Walter L. Buenger, Secession, TEX. ST. HIST. ASS’N (June 15, 2010), 
http://www.tshaonline.org/handbook/online/articles/mgs02 (describing the political and 
military buildup to the Texas referendum and observing that “[t]he seizure of the San 
Antonio arsenal, the evacuation of federal troops, and the sending of delegates to 
Montgomery made the secession referendum appear an insignificant afterthought”). 
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The Texas case is illustrative. In January 1861, sixty-one 
representatives from the Texas state legislature convened a state 
convention on secession, acting without clear legal authority.99 Some 
parts of the state sent elected delegates to the convention, while other 
parts of the state did not.100 The delegate elections suffered from 
serious procedural problems that cast doubt on their fairness, even by 
nineteenth century standards.101 Many were elected by voice vote at 
public meetings that unionists were discouraged from attending, or 
that were ignored by unionists who considered them illegal, so the 
resulting delegate pool overwhelmingly favored secession.102 
Afterward, the legislature passed an act ratifying these elections, 
attempting to provide posthoc legal authority for the convention that 
had been lacking at the outset.103 
On February 1, 1861, the convention adopted an ordinance of 
secession that would be put to a popular vote on February 23, 
1861.104 But even before the popular vote was held, Texas sent 
delegates to participate in the formation of the Confederate States of 
America.105 Meanwhile, the convention also empowered a newly 
formed Committee on Public Safety to seize all federal property in 
Texas, including the federal arsenal, and ordered the evacuation of 
three thousand federal troops in Texas.106 The ordinance of secession 
ultimately passed by a wide margin in the popular vote,107 but there 
was also evidence that voters with unionist sentiments were actively 
 
99 Texas v. White, 74 U.S. 700, 704 (1868). 
100 Id. 
101 Walter L. Buenger, Secession Convention, TEX. ST. HIST. ASS’N (June 15, 2010), 
https://tshaonline.org/handbook/online/articles/mjs01 [hereinafter Buenger, Secession 
Convention]. 
102 Id. 
103 White, 74 U.S. at 704. 
104 Id. 
105 Buenger, Secession, supra note 98. 
106 Id. 
107 See White, 74 U.S. at 704 (noting that the ordinance was adopted by a vote of 
34,794 to 11,235); RANDOLPH B. CAMPBELL, AN EMPIRE FOR SLAVERY: THE PECULIAR 
INSTITUTION IN TEXAS, 1821–1865 229 (1989) (noting that Texans approved secession by 
a different margin: 46,129 to 14,697). 
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intimidated with threats of violence.108 Variations on this theme later 
unfolded in Tennessee,109 Virginia,110 and Arkansas.111 
Other states joined the Confederacy without pretense of a popular 
referendum. They claimed the right to secede as an aspect of state 
sovereignty, severing political and economic ties with the northern 
states. The rest of the Union did not accept their departure. While the 
southern states claimed rights of self-determination, the north 
maintained that secession was beyond state authority. As the Supreme 
Court would later affirm, the Constitution nowhere considers a right 
of secession, nor does it provide for territorial referenda on the 
question.112 The “rebellion” of the southern states, as it was framed in 
the north, was ultimately quelled by force in a war that claimed over 
600,000 lives.113 After a protracted and devastating conflict, the 
southern forces were vanquished in 1865, the Constitution was 
 
108 Buenger, Secession, supra note 98 (noting evidence of violence and intimidation, 
and that “[f]ew opponents of secession spoke out on the eve of the secession referendum. 
Most probably did not vote”). 
109 E.g., NELSON & SHERIFF, supra note 20, at 54 (describing procedural irregularities, 
voter fraud, military intimidation and other problems compromising the Tennessee 
referendum). Tennessee held a statewide referendum choosing secession on June 8, 1861, 
but the referendum was subsequent and secondary to the political determination that had 
already been reached by the state government. Id. The legislature had already declared 
secession, secession troops had already been mobilized, and pro-union meetings were 
broken up. Id. 
110 RICHARD ORR CURRY, A HOUSE DIVIDED: A STUDY OF STATEHOOD POLITICS AND 
THE COPPERHEAD MOVEMENT IN WEST VIRGINIA 36–37 (1964) (describing fear and 
intimidation preceding the Virginia referendum, including coerced oaths of loyalty to the 
Confederacy even before the ballot was taken). Virginia’s referendum was held after 
troops had already been marshalled, compromising neutral balloting in some areas of the 
state. Id. Many votes, especially from the Union-leaning western portion of the state, were 
lost or discarded and therefore never counted. Ratification of the Ordinance of Secession, 
W. VA. ARCHIVES & HIST., http://www.wvculture.org/ history/statehood/statehood06.html 
(last visited Oct. 15, 2017). In lieu of these missing ballots, the governor added to the final 
count his own estimate of what he believed these votes would have been, Referendum on 
Secession, LIBR. VA, http://edu.lva.virginia.gov/online_classroom/union_or_secession/unit 
/10/referendum_on_secession (last visited Oct. 15, 2017), hastening West Virginia’s 
secession from Virginia and from the Confederacy a few months later. West Virginia 
Statehood, W. VA. ARCHIVES & HIST., http://www.wvculture.org/history/archives 
/statehoo.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2017). 
111 MICHAEL B. DOUGAN, CONFEDERATE ARKANSAS: THE PEOPLE AND POLICIES OF A 
FRONTIER STATE IN WARTIME 46 (1976) (describing threats and intimidation associated 
with the Arkansas referendum). 
112 See White, 74 U.S. at 726. 
113 Civil War Facts, CIVIL WAR TRUST, http://www.civilwar.org/learn/articles/civil-war 
-facts/ (last visited Oct. 15, 2017). 
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amended to forbid slavery in all forms, and the nation set to work 
rebuilding itself for the second half of its existence.114 
Yet even after it was clear that the nation would remain intact, 
serious legal questions confronted the weakened Union. Secession 
had been militarily blocked, but the question that would then 
preoccupy the Supreme Court was: what happens now? How should 
the nation interpret its new relationship with the would-be 
secessionist states? They had disavowed their position within the 
Union and then been forced back, but the new question was: were 
they even still states? Or were they something else now? Given that 
they had returned only by conquest, what did that mean for the 
apparatus of state governments that were still intact (and which had 
led the rebellion)? Did they have the same degree of sovereign 
authority as before the war? Were their representatives eligible to 
serve in Congress? Would they participate in governance over the rest 
of the Union? Or were they now just conquered territory, subject to 
direct federal rule until further dispositions were made? 
The U.S. Supreme Court confronted the underlying question—
“were the Confederate states still states?”—in Texas v. White, an 1868 
case addressing the comparatively arcane issue of whether Texas state 
war bonds would be honored.115 To answer that question, the Court 
first had to decide whether Texas had even been a state in the 
immediate aftermath of the Civil War.116 After wrestling with the 
issue and its implications, the Court ultimately concluded that Texas 
was indeed a state, and had been for the purpose of resolving the war 
bonds issue.117 Indeed, all the states that had attempted to secede 
were still states, and had never stopped being states—because, simply 
put, the U.S. Constitution does not allow for secession.118 As the 
Court intoned, there is no secession in the United States.119 Therefore, 
 
114 Id. 
115 White, 74 U.S. at 700. 
116 Id. at 724 (“Did Texas, in consequence of these acts, cease to be a State? Or, if not, 
did the State cease to be a member of the Union?”). 
117 Id. at 731 (“It suffices to say, that the terms of the acts necessarily imply recognition 
of actually existing governments; and that in point of fact, the governments thus 
recognized, in some important respects, still exist.”). 
118 Id. at 726 (“The union between Texas and the other States was as complete, as 
perpetual, and as indissoluble as the union between the original States. There was no place 
for reconsideration, or revocation, except through revolution, or through consent of the 
States.”). 
119 Id. at 725 (“The Constitution, in all its provisions, looks to an indestructible Union 
composed of indestructible States.”). 
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whatever these states may have claimed, they hadn’t actually 
seceded—they had just very badly misbehaved. More accurately, the 
individuals involved had misbehaved—because the states themselves 
had nothing to do with it.120 
The Court observed that immediately after the war, the president 
was entitled to establish a provisional government (composed of 
leaders other than those that had led the rebellion) in order to fulfill 
his constitutional duty to guarantee republican government 
throughout the land.121 Since then, however, elections had been taken, 
republican representation was in place, and Texas and its sister states 
could return to normal constitutional status.122 Of note, during the 
period of provisional governance after the war, the sitting legislature 
took advantage of the temporary southern disenfranchisement in 
Congress to pass the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution,123 
which guarantees equal protection of law to all people within its 
jurisdiction, including former slaves in southern states.124 It is a great 
irony, perhaps, that this critically important part of our Constitution, 
articulating dearly held American ideals, arose during such 
circumstances of procedural irregularity—but it is also suggestive of 
the disorderliness, contingency, and occasionally improvisational 
quality of governance during times of great historical challenge.125 
Regardless, Texas v. White definitely interpreted the constitutional 
boundaries of national-level secession, establishing that secession is 
 
120 See id. at 727. 
121 Id. at 729. 
122 See id. at 731. 
123 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
124 Id. The period immediately after the war was one of staggering political instability 
for the United States. Even before the war’s end, the President’s December 8, 1863, 
Proclamation to Congress envisioned a forced Union, but one that would invite the 
southern delegations back to Washington to participate in federal governance. See 
Proclamation No. 11, 13 Stat. 737 (1863). However, procedural irregularities, including 
the sitting Congress’ refusal to seat the southern delegation, enabled Congress to enact (in 
the absence of that delegation) what would become among the most important pieces of 
the U.S. Constitution: the Fourteenth Amendment, promising equal protection of the law 
to all people, including slaves. See Dyett v. Turner, 439 P.2d 266, 270–74 (Utah 1968) 
(providing detailed recitations of the procedural irregularities resulting in this troubled 
historical moment); Pinckney G. McElwee, The 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the 
United States and the Threat that it Poses to our Democratic Government, 11 S.C. L.Q. 
484, 487–500 (1959). 
125 But see generally 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 
(1998) (defending the origins of the Fourteenth Amendment on grounds that all procedural 
irregularity has been subsequently legitimized by overwhelming legal, political, and 
cultural ratification). 
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unavailable within the U.S. constitutional order, unless the remaining 
states all consent. Courts continue to heed this precedent today, as did 
the Alaska Supreme Court in 2010, when it rejected the ballot 
initiative proposing Alaskan secession.126 In that decision, the Alaska 
justices quoted the memorable words of the U.S. Supreme Court in 
White: 
The Constitution, in all its provisions, looks to an indestructible 
Union, composed of indestructible States. When, therefore, Texas 
became one of the United States, she entered into an indissoluble 
relation. All the obligations of perpetual union, and all the 
guaranties of republican government in the Union, attached at once 
to the State. The act which consummated her admission into the 
Union was something more than a compact; it was the incorporation 
of a new member into the political body. And it was final. The 
union between Texas and other States was as complete, as 
perpetual, and as indissoluble as the union between the original 
States. There was no place for reconsideration, or revocation, except 
through revolution, or through consent of the States.127 
The Union is thus protected against all but consensual departure or 
revolution—and that revolution, unlike the U.S. Civil War, must 
succeed in order to accomplish its goals. 
II 
FEDERALISM IN THE UNITED STATES 
In lieu of secession, the United States has developed a very 
different model for working out regional conflict: the federal system 
of governance, which divides sovereign power between a central 
administration and regional subunits.128 In the United States, 
separately sourced authority is vested in the national government and 
fifty regional states.129 The Constitution confers enumerated 
sovereign powers on the national government, while reserving 
residual sovereign authority associated with the pre-constitutional 
police powers of the states.130 The states further disseminate their 
 
126 Kohlhaas v. State, 223 P.3d 105 (Alaska 2010) (discussed supra notes 34–37 and 
accompanying text). 
127 Id. at 110 n.22 (citing Texas v. White, 74 U.S. 700, 725–26 (1868)). 
128 See RYAN, TUG OF WAR, supra note 16, at 7–8. 
129 See infra notes 135–46 (describing how authority is allocated among the national 
and state governments). 
130 See infra notes 135–146; see also Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 564–71 (2009) 
(discussing the presumption against federal preemption of state authority under their 
traditional “police powers” to protect the public). 
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power locally among municipal agencies, and occasionally laterally, 
in partnerships with other states by constitutionally permissible 
interstate compacts.131 
The innovation of federalism was first conceived during the 
debates of the American Constitutional Convention of 1787, about a 
decade after former colonies separated from Britain during the 
American Revolution.132 The leaders of the newly independent states 
had been forced to concede the failure of their first attempt at a 
comparatively decentralized confederation (under the 1777 Articles of 
Confederation), and they now sought to establish a more enduring 
union that would better balance the competing objectives of 
autonomy and interdependence that inform good pluralist 
governance.133 Today, the dynamics of American federalism provide 
multiple simultaneous pathways for regional dissent and 
differentiation, interjurisdictional competition, and collaborative 
governance.134 
The availability of multiple sites for political contest and 
innovation has proven useful for many reasons, but one of them is 
surely the way that federalism effectively rechannels regional 
frustration away from calls for secession and into a more cohesive 
fabric of vibrant multilevel governance. This Part reviews the overall 
structure of American federalism, the good governance values that 
undergird it, and the role of federalism theory in navigating inevitable 
constitutional uncertainty about how to reconcile competing values in 
different policy contexts. 
 
131 See generally FREDERICK L. ZIMMERMANN & MITCHELL WENDELL, THE 
INTERSTATE COMPACT SINCE 1925 (1951). 
132 See generally ALISON L. LACROIX, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF AMERICAN 
FEDERALISM (2010); EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., ORIGINALISM, FEDERALISM, AND THE 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL ENTERPRISE: A HISTORICAL INQUIRY (2007). 
133 See RYAN, TUG OF WAR, supra note 16, at 70–73. 
134 See, e.g., id.; Erin Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1 (2011) 
[hereinafter Ryan, Negotiating Federalism]; Erin Ryan, Federalism and the Tug of War 
Within: Seeking Checks and Balance in the Interjurisdictional Gray Area, 66 MD. L. REV. 
503 (2007) [hereinafter Ryan, Seeking Checks and Balance]; see also Erin Ryan, 
Environmental Federalism’s Tug of War Within, in THE LAW AND POLICY OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL FEDERALISM: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 355 (Kalyani Robbins ed., 
2015) [hereinafter Ryan, Environmental Federalism]; Erin Ryan, The Once and Future 
Challenges of American Federalism: The Tug of War Within, in 1 THE WAYS OF 
FEDERALISM IN WESTERN COUNTRIES AND THE HORIZONS OF TERRITORIAL AUTONOMY 
IN SPAIN 267 (Alberto López Basaguren & Leire Escajedo San Epifanio eds., 2013). 
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A. The Structure and Function of American Federalism 
American federalism is structured as a system of dual sovereignty, 
constitutionally conferring certain sovereign powers on the new 
national government while reserving others to the regional states that 
predated the Union (and to those that would later follow, on “equal 
footing” with the original states).135 The Constitution confers, or 
“enumerates,” a list of powers for national governance, including both 
specific powers (such as those over postal roads, copyrights, and 
war)136 and comparatively open-ended powers (to tax and spend for 
the public welfare, to regulate interstate commerce, and to regulate as 
“necessary and proper” for carrying out other enumerated powers).137 
Where legitimate national governance conflicts with state or local 
law, the central (or “federal”) law has preemptive force under the 
Constitution’s Supremacy Clause.138 However, the Tenth 
Amendment clarifies that those powers not delegated to the national 
government are reserved to the states (or to the people),139 indicating 
that separate sovereign authority is constitutionally intended at both 
levels simultaneously.140 
The existence of the Supremacy Clause implicitly recognizes that 
there have always been areas of potential overlap between state and 
national jurisdiction, and the increasing complexity of national 
interdependence over time has widened the scope of jurisdictional 
overlap141 (in addition to further overlap with municipal governance 
within states, regional partnerships between states, and separately 
sovereign American Indian tribes).142 Nevertheless, the structure of 
dual sovereignty ensures that no level of government has absolute 
authority, and neither the federal nor state governments can fully 
displace the other. In congruence with the principle of subsidiarity, 
regulatory matters are generally governed at the most local level with 
 
135 See Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 566 (1911) (interpreting the equal footing 
doctrine); RYAN, TUG OF WAR, supra note 16, at 7–8. 
136 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 7, 8, 11. 
137 Id. cls. 1, 3, 18. 
138 Id. art. VI, cl. 2. 
139 Id. amend. X. 
140 See RYAN, TUG OF WAR, supra note 16, at 8–10. 
141 Id. at 146–47. 
142 See Heather K. Gerken, The Supreme Court, 2009 Term—Foreword: Federalism 
All the Way Down, 124 HARV. L. REV. 4, 34–44 (2010) [hereinafter Gerken, Federalism 
All the Way Down] (discussing the dynamics of jurisdictional overlap at multiple levels). 
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capacity to resolve them.143 The constitutional enumeration of powers 
tracks those regulatory arenas in which central governance is 
presumed necessary, and leaves other matters to the competence of 
state or local regulation.144 As such, the multiple American 
sovereigns deal separately with those issues that fall within their 
exclusive regulatory purviews, and they engage in ways ranging from 
collaboration to competition to cope with issues that straddle 
jurisdictional boundaries.145 
While federalism diffuses authority vertically between the national 
and state levels of government, related separation-of-powers doctrines 
diffuse authority horizontally among the three branches of American 
government146 (which are then replicated vertically downward within 
each of the fifty states). As a result, the American system is easily 
critiqued as confusing, prone to jurisdictional conflict, and needlessly 
inefficient.147 Yet Americans generally tolerate these problems in 
light of the benefits federalism has conferred in balancing our 
competing political demands for local autonomy and national 
interdependence. Demands for local autonomy, which predominate in 
claims for secession, are addressed by the increased political agency 
and independence available within state and local governance in the 
federal system. These demands are moderated by the recognition of 
national interdependence on matters that include national security, 
commercial productivity, environmental protection, and the normative 
commitments of constitutional law. 
Ideally, federalism strengthens local autonomy and meaningful 
self-determination by preserving state regulatory authority over 
matters where state or local government have superior governing 
capacity. For example, in the United States, traditional areas of state 
and local competence include zoning, land use regulation, local 
policing, and elections.148 Yet while federalism protects these zones 
 
143 RYAN, TUG OF WAR, supra note 16, at 59–60. 
144 Id. at 61–63. 
145 See id. at 265–70 (discussing various ways that state and federal actors cope with 
jurisdictional overlap). 
146 Erin Ryan, Negotiating Federalism and the Structural Constitution: Navigating the 
Separation of Powers Both Vertically and Horizontally, 115 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 4, 
5 (2015) [hereinafter Ryan, Negotiating Federalism and the Structural Constitution]. 
147 See, e.g., Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a 
National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903, 906–07 (1994). See also MALCOLM M. FEELEY 
& EDWARD RUBIN, FEDERALISM: POLITICAL IDENTITY AND TRAGIC COMPROMISE (2008) 
(following up the earlier work). 
148 RYAN, TUG OF WAR, supra note 16, at xii. 
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of local autonomy, it does so within the bounds of strong central 
authority for coping with the kinds of collective action problems that 
can undermine atomistic local regulation—such as those that would 
hamper the management of interstate commerce, boundary-crossing 
environmental harms, or national defense.149 Local autonomy is also 
constrained within the ambit of strong central authority for 
vindicating national consensus on core constitutional rights, such as 
freedom of expression and equal protection of the laws. American 
federalism relies on national power to ensure that these rights are 
upheld, even when enforcing them requires overriding local 
autonomy in a given circumstance.150 For example, even if you live in 
a region of the country where the majority of citizens wish you and 
your political party would stop speaking, your rights to engage in 
political speech will be protected, even against contrary state or local 
laws.151 
B. Federalism as a Strategy for Good Governance 
In pursuit of this elusive balance, federalism in the United States 
and elsewhere is thus designed to cultivate the “sweet spot” between 
fully local and fully centralized governance, encouraging regulatory 
systems in which decisions are made at the level where they make the 
most sense. Importantly, however, and often overlooked in the older 
literature, federalism’s “sweet spot” is dynamic and subject to 
renegotiation over time, through the processes of competition and 
collaboration that are facilitated by healthy multilevel governance.152 
While American federalism is often characterized as a naked contest 
between state and federal power, it is better understood as a site of 
negotiation in which political actors at various levels of government 
 
149 See Ryan, Environmental Federalism, supra note 134, at 362–66 (discussing the 
role of American federalism in policing collective action problems and enforcing core 
constitutional promises). 
150 U.S. CONST. amends. I, XIV. 
151 See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 399 (1989) (invalidating state laws 
criminalizing desecration of the American flag for violating the First Amendment’s 
protection of symbolic speech). 
152 See RYAN, TUG OF WAR, supra note 16, at 266–67 (discussing negotiated federal 
governance); Ryan, Environmental Federalism, supra note 134, at 412–13 (drawing 
examples of negotiated governance from environmental law); see also Heather K. Gerken, 
Dissenting by Deciding, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1745, 1784–85 (2005) [hereinafter Gerken, 
Dissenting by Deciding]; Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative 
Federalism, 118 YALE L.J. 1256, 1258–60 (2009) [hereinafter Uncooperative 
Federalism]; Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, supra note 134, at 4–5. 
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to work out a continually shifting balance between competing good 
governance values.153 Indeed, the best way to understand federalism 
in general, and perhaps American federalism in particular, is in terms 
of these underlying values. 
Federalism is, at its heart, a strategy for good governance—based 
on a set of clear values that we hope federalism will help us 
accomplish.154 In a previous book, Federalism and the Tug of War 
Within, and other work, I extrapolate five foundational values that 
American federalism is designed to advance, based on analysis of the 
legislative history of the Constitutional Convention, later Supreme 
Court interpretations, congressional and executive pronouncements, 
and the academic literature.155 These emphasize the maintenance of 
(1) checks and balances between opposing centers of power that 
protect individuals, (2) governmental accountability and transparency 
that enhance democratic participation, (3) local autonomy that enables 
interjurisdictional innovation and competition, (4) centralized 
authority to manage collective action problems and vindicate core 
constitutional promises, and finally (5) the regulatory problem-
solving synergy that federalism enables between the unique 
governance capacities of local and national actors for coping with 
problems that neither can resolve alone.156 
As I have described in this previous work, governance in pursuit of 
these values advances individual dignity within healthy 
 
153 See RYAN, TUG OF WAR, supra note 16, at xi–xii.  
154 Id. at xiv. 
155 Id. at 34−67. In the original book and Article, I discuss the four federalism values 
most directly voiced in American federalism jurisprudence: checks and balances, 
transparency and accountability, localism values, and the problem-solving value implied 
by subsidiarity. The values of centralized authority are implied by the value of 
intergovernmental problem-solving synergy, but in later exploration of the material, I 
added more overt discussion of how centralized power counterbalances localism values 
within federalism. See Ryan, Environmental Federalism, supra note 134, at 362–64. 
Because they are implicit in the creation of an overall nation-state, the values of central 
administration are debated less directly in the many cases that presume centralized 
national authority but debate its appropriate relationship with subnational authority. 
However, as the discourse has progressed, I believe it is worth highlighting it more 
explicitly as the fifth in the series. 
156 See RYAN, TUG OF WAR, supra note 16, at xiv, 34–67 (specifically detailing the 
values of checks, transparency, localism, and synergy and dealing more holistically with 
the nationalism values necessarily implied by a federal system); Ryan, Environmental 
Federalism, supra note 134, at 362–64 (summarizing these and explicitly adding 
centralized authority). 
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communities.157 It enhances democratic governance principles of 
self-determination while recognizing the responsibilities that group 
members hold toward one another. It creates a laboratory for 
innovations in governance from multiple possible sources158 and 
facilitates multiple planes of negotiation among competing interests 
and interest groups.159 It appropriately honors both sides of the 
subsidiarity principle—the directive to solve problems at the most 
local level possible160—which notably couples its preference for local 
autonomy in governance with the expectation of effective regulatory 
problem-solving (and by implication, at whatever level will achieve 
it).161 Good federalism-sensitive governance is especially powerful at 
diffusing the kinds of regional tension that could foment secession 
under other circumstances. 
Nevertheless, identifying what federalism is designed to 
accomplish is only the first part of the puzzle. The harder task is 
figuring out how these goals fit together. The core federalism values 
are doubtlessly all good things in and of themselves, and American 
governance has long aspired to realize each of them independently. 
Yet our success has been complicated by the fact that each individual 
value is suspended in a web of tensions with the others. No matter 
how we may try, the hard truth is that they all cannot always be 
satisfied simultaneously in any given context. The regulatory choices 
we make inevitably involve tradeoffs, in which one value may 
 
157 The following description of the original work in RYAN, TUG OF WAR, supra note 
16, at 34–67, closely tracks my description of it in a later work, Ryan, Environmental 
Federalism, supra note 134, at 362–64. 
158 For the most famous statement of this principle, see New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 
285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (comparing the states to laboratories in 
which to “try novel social and economic experiments”). 
159 See RYAN, TUG OF WAR, supra note 16, at 265–367 (discussing negotiated 
federalism among the various levels and branches of government). See generally Ryan, 
Negotiating Federalism, supra note 134 (introducing the analysis that evolved into this 
final part of the book). 
160 See, e.g., Robert K. Vischer, Subsidiarity as a Principle of Governance: Beyond 
Devolution, 35 IND. L. REV. 103 (2001). For various accounts of the subsidiarity principle, 
see David P. Currie, Subsidiarity, 1 GREEN BAG 2d 359 (1998); James L. Huffman, 
Making Environmental Regulation More Adaptive Through Decentralization: The Case 
for Subsidiarity, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 1377 (2004); John F. Stinneford, Subsidiarity, 
Federalism, and Federal Prosecution of Street Crime, 2 J. CATH. SOC. THOUGHT 495 
(2005); W. Gary Vause, The Subsidiarity Principle in European Union Law—American 
Federalism Compared, 27 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 61 (1995); Jared Bayer, Comment, 
Re-Balancing State and Federal Power: Toward a Political Principle of Subsidiarity in 
the United States, 53 AM. U.L. REV. 1421 (2004). 
161 See RYAN, TUG OF WAR, supra note 16, at 59–66. 
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partially eclipse another.162 Conflicts between localism and 
nationalism are obvious, but the network of tension runs much deeper 
and among all the various values. 
For example, consider the tension between the values of (1) checks 
on sovereign authority and (2) transparent and accountable 
government. Federalism promotes a balanced system of checks on 
sovereign authority at both the state and federal level,163 enabling the 
useful tool of governance that I have previously called “regulatory 
backstop,” which protects individuals against government excess or 
abdication by either side.164 When sovereign authority at one level 
fails to protect the vulnerable, regulatory backstop ensures that it 
remains available to do so at a different level. 
The history of American civil rights law reveals especially famous 
examples, including periods in which the federal government 
protected the rights of African Americans forsaken by state law165 
and more modern examples in which states have acted first to protect 
rights unrecognized by federal law, including those of LGBT 
citizens166 and the owners of property subject to eminent domain.167 
Environmental law showcases equally compelling examples of dual 
sovereignty at its best,168 including the 1970s era in which the federal 
government acted to prevent excessive air and water pollution when 
most states had failed to do so,169 and the current era in which many 
 
162 See id. at 38–39 (and more generally at 34–67). 
163 Id. at 39–44 (discussing checks and balances). 
164 Id. at 42–43 (discussing regulatory backstop). 
165 See, e.g., Marilyn K. Howard, Discrimination, in 1 THE JIM CROW ENCYCLOPEDIA 
222, 226–27 (Nikki L.M. Brown & Barry M. Stentiford eds., 2008). 
166 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 24-34-401 to -402 (2007) (barring discrimination in 
hiring based on sexual orientation); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 8 (2009) (amending marriage 
definition from union between a man and woman to a union between two people); see 
Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003) (asserting that the 
Massachusetts constitution is more protective of civil rights than the federal Constitution 
in invalidating a state statutory ban on same-sex marriages). More recently, the Supreme 
Court removed an important federal obstacle to state efforts to legalize gay marriage. See 
United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (U.S. 2013) (invalidating parts of the federal 
Defense of Marriage Act); Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (U.S. 2015) (establishing 
a federal constitutional right to same-sex marriage); cf. Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, 
supra note 152 (discussing San Francisco’s decision to issue gay marriage licenses despite 
contrary state law). 
167 See, e.g., Tim Hoover, Eminent Domain Reform Signed, KAN. CITY STAR, July 14, 
2006, at B2 (reporting on new state law property rights). 
168 See RYAN, TUG OF WAR, supra note 16, at xxvii–xxix. 
169 See Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (2006); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401 
(2006). 
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states are moving to address the causes and effects of climate change 
at a time when the national government has not succeeded.170 
The availability of regulatory backstop, however, exacts a price. 
The very maintenance of checks and balances between state and 
national actors itself frustrates the independent value of transparency, 
making it harder for the average citizen to navigate the lines of 
governmental accountability (and know whom to blame for bad 
policy choices).171 This is especially problematic in realms of 
extreme jurisdictional overlap, such as environmental or criminal law, 
where legitimate state and federal governance takes place 
simultaneously.172 
As I describe in Federalism and the Tug of War Within, if all we 
cared about were the good governance values of transparency and 
accountability, the best alternative would be a unitary system of 
government, such as that used in China.173 Alternatively, if checks 
and balances were the primary governance ideal, then we should do 
away with the Constitution’s Supremacy Clause,174 which gives the 
national government a powerful edge in many state-federal 
conflicts.175 If localism values were primary, then our best course of 
action would be a confederal system among powerful states and a 
weak center, lacking federal constitutional supremacy (not unlike the 
nation’s first experiment with the Articles of Confederation).176 
Instead, Americans tolerate the open tension between checks and 
transparency, and the obvious conflicts between localism and strong 
national power, and all the other tradeoffs that palpably manifest 
among the five values—precisely to reap the federalism-facilitated 
benefits of local autonomy when desirable, national uniformity when 
preferable, regulatory backstop when necessary, and 
 
170 See, e.g., Kirsten H. Engel, Whither Subnational Climate Change Initiatives in the 
Wake of Federal Climate Legislation?, 39 PUBLIUS 432 (2009); Kirsten Engel, State and 
Local Climate Change Initiatives: What is Motivating State and Local Governments to 
Address a Global Problem and What Does This Say About Federalism and Environmental 
Law?, 38 URB. LAW. 1015 (2006). 
171 See RYAN, TUG OF WAR, supra note 16, at 43–50. 
172 See id. at 145–80. 
173 Id. at 48. 
174 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
175 See RYAN, TUG OF WAR, supra note 16, at 43–44. 
176 See id. Notably, this unsuccessful experiment was rejected in favor of true 
federalism. See id. 
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interjurisdictional problem-solving when inevitable.177 Strong local 
authority expands opportunities for democratic participation, 
encourages well-tailored governance, facilitates diversity, inspires 
innovation, and encourages interjurisdictional competition.178 Strong 
national power resolves collective action problems, facilitates 
markets, manages border-crossing harms and large-scale public 
commons, speaks to the world with a unitary voice, and vindicates 
nonnegotiable constitutional promises.179 Ideally, coupling healthy 
local authority with strong national power facilitates the kind of 
dynamic interjurisdictional synergy in governance that makes for the 
most effective regulatory response—drawing on the distinctive forms 
of governance capacity that develop respectively at the local and 
national level to solve pressing interjurisdictional problems that 
require both.180 
C. Constitutional Indeterminacy and Federalism Theory 
With values-based competition implicit in all federalism 
quandaries, each dilemma demands that decision-makers choose, 
consciously or otherwise, how to prioritize among these conflicting 
federalism values. Navigating that tension toward resolution usually 
provides good direction on the associated issue of where to assign 
regulatory responsibility along the continuum from local to national 
governance, but it is not always conclusive.181 Allocating authority 
and reconciling these competing values are daunting tasks, and 
ongoing federalism controversies in such realms as environmental 
law, health care law, immigration, marriage rights, and religious 
expression highlight the deep interpretive tensions involved in 
navigating American federalism.182 
Indeed, these controversies underscore the fundamental problem 
for managing federalism in the United States, which is that of 
 
177 See id. at 34–67. 
178 See id. at 50–59. 
179 See, e.g., EDWARD MILLICAN, ONE UNITED PEOPLE: THE FEDERALIST PAPERS AND 
THE NATIONAL IDEA (1990). 
180 See RYAN, TUG OF WAR, supra note 16, at 59–66, 145–80, 265–367. See generally 
Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, supra note 134 (exploring intergovernmental bargaining as 
a means of harnessing interjurisdictional synergy). 
181 See RYAN, TUG OF WAR, supra note 16, at 8–17, 145–80 (discussing inherent 
indeterminacy in the Constitution’s federalism directives and the resulting 
interjurisdictional gray area in federalism sensitive governance). 
182 See Ryan, Environmental Federalism, supra note 134, at 2–3 and accompanying 
notes (listing ongoing federalism controversies in American governance). 
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constitutional indeterminacy. The American Constitution mandates—
but incompletely describes—the system of dual sovereignty implied 
by the various federalism directives scattered throughout its text.183 
Applying these directives in the absence of clearer constraints 
necessarily requires interpreters to rely, consciously or otherwise, on 
some exogenous theory of federalism for help—to fill in the 
constitutional blanks that inevitably arise when these relatively vague 
federalism directives are applied to specific cases and 
controversies.184 The theoretical tools employed must be consistent 
with constitutional mandates, but they cannot be found entirely within 
the document itself. Those tasked with policymaking and adjudication 
need some kind of operating theory to interpret it. 
As a result, American federalism jurisprudence has vacillated 
substantially over time, as the Supreme Court, Congress, and other 
interpreters have experimented with different theoretical models to fill 
in these blanks.185 At various points in American history, including 
the early years of the republic and during the Supreme Court’s “New 
Federalism revival” of the 1990s, the Court grounded its federalism 
adjudication in an idealized model of “dual federalism.”186 Dual 
federalism privileges the check-and-balance value in idealizing a 
system of mutually exclusive state and federal jurisdictional 
spheres—notwithstanding the marked departure of this ideal from the 
reality of an American system suffused with jurisdictional overlap.187 
By contrast, the preferred model of federalism during the New 
Deal era of the 1940s and the Great Society era of the 1960s 
 
183 See RYAN, TUG OF WAR, supra note 16, at xiv. These directives include powers 
enumerated to the different branches of government in various articles and amendments 
(for example, those delegated to Congress under Article I, Section 8 or Section 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment), the recognition of ongoing state authority in various articles and 
amendments (for example, the responsibilities for national elections conferred in Article 1, 
Section 2, and Article II, Section 1), and the relationship between them suggested by the 
Tenth Amendment. See id. at 8–9. 
184 See id. at 7–33 (discussing the possibility of multiple models of American 
federalism, all consistent with constitutional directives). 
185 See id. at 68–104 (analyzing the different theoretical models of federalism in use 
over the history of American governance and jurisprudence). 
186 See id. at 98–104, 109–44 (reviewing dual federalism and analyzing the Rehnquist 
Court’s New Federalism revival). 
187 See MORTON GRODZINS, THE AMERICAN SYSTEM 8, 60–153 (Daniel J. Elazar ed., 
2d ed. 1984); RYAN, TUG OF WAR, supra note 16, at 145–80 (reviewing the 
interjurisdictional challenge to dual federalism). In fact, jurisdictional overlap is so 
prevalent in American governance that it has been famously compared to “marble cake,” 
with entangled swirls of interlocking local and national law. See id. at xii. 
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privileged nationalism in service to the problem-solving value—
elevating the need for strong federal power to solve critical societal 
problems after the Great Depression and during the Civil Rights 
Movement—but with less regard for the values of checks, localism, or 
accountability (and arguably fomenting the social frustration that 
would later lead to the modern New Federalism and Tea Party 
Movements).188 The federalism discourse is only just beginning to 
appreciate how this unresolved “tug of war” for privilege among 
competing federalism values has led to the Supreme Court’s 
notoriously fluctuating federalism jurisprudence.189 
Notwithstanding the dual federalism model that continues to 
influence the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, the model of 
cooperative federalism predominates in the actual practice of 
federalism-sensitive governance.190 Cooperative federalism 
acknowledges the reality of jurisdictional overlap between legitimate 
state and federal interests, and it allows for regulatory partnerships in 
which state and federal actors take responsibility for interlocking 
parts of a larger regulatory whole.191 This model seeks a middle 
ground between the excessive jurisdictional separation of pure dual 
federalism and the fear that New Deal federalism would obliterate 
dual sovereignty. Nevertheless, the critics of cooperative federalism 
 
188 See RYAN, TUG OF WAR, supra note 16, at 84–88, 98–104 (reviewing New Deal 
Federalism and the rise of New Federalism and the Tea Party). 
189 The literature on American federalism has exploded in recent years with interesting 
new perspectives on dynamic and innovative federalism theory. While all sources are too 
numerous to list, a worthy tour would include: ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, ENHANCING 
GOVERNMENT: FEDERALISM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (2008); JOHN D. NUGENT, 
SAFEGUARDING FEDERALISM: HOW STATES PROTECT THEIR INTERESTS IN NATIONAL 
POLICYMAKING (2009); Rubin & Feeley, supra note 147; RYAN, TUG OF WAR, supra note 
16; ROBERT A. SCHAPIRO, POLYPHONIC FEDERALISM: TOWARD THE PROTECTION OF 
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS (2009); Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Partisan Federalism, 127 HARV. 
L. REV. 1077 (2014); Uncooperative Federalism, supra note 152; William W. Buzbee, 
Interaction’s Promise: Preemption Policy Shifts, Risk Regulation, and Experimentalism 
Lessons, 57 EMORY L.J. 145 (2007); Kirsten H. Engel, Harnessing the Benefits of 
Dynamic Federalism in Environmental Law, 56 EMORY L.J. 159 (2006); Gerken, 
Federalism All the Way Down, supra note 142; Abbe R. Gluck, Our [National] 
Federalism, 123 YALE L.J. 1996 (2014). More traditional and historical perspectives are 
also an important part of the recent federalism discourse: see, e.g., JENNA BEDNAR, THE 
ROBUST FEDERATION: PRINCIPLES OF DESIGN (2009); MICHAEL S. GREVE, THE UPSIDE-
DOWN CONSTITUTION (2012); LACROIX, supra note 132; PURCELL, supra note 132. 
190 See RYAN, TUG OF WAR, supra note 16, at 89–98 (reviewing cooperative 
federalism). 
191 Id. at 94–95. 
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variously assail the model as overly ad hoc, undertheorized, and 
coercive.192 
In response to shortcomings in these paradigmatic models, a host 
of new scholarship is developing newer theoretical conceptions of 
American federalism,193 including the Balanced Federalism model 
that I proposed in Federalism and the Tug of War Within.194 Balanced 
Federalism emphasizes dynamic interaction among the various levels 
of government and shared interpretive responsibility among the three 
branches of government, with the overall goal of achieving a balance 
among the competing federalism values that is both dynamic and 
adaptive over time.195 The full elaboration in the book helps provide 
the missing theoretical justification for the tools of cooperative 
federalism that predominate in modern American governance, as well 
as support for future moves by environmental governance toward 
even greater dynamic engagement.196 It emphasizes the skillful 
deployment of legislative, executive, and judicial capacity at each 
level of federalism-sensitive governance, allocating authority based 
on the specific forms of decision-making in which they excel.197 
These newer theoretical models demonstrate how well-crafted 
multi-scalar governance deflates the more traditional presumption of 
 
192 See id. at 96–98 (discussing frustration with cooperative federalism), 273–76 
(discussing the federalism safeguards debate); see also GREVE, supra note 189 (assailing 
cooperative federalism as coercive and collusive). 
193 See, e.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 189; GREVE, supra note 189; SCHAPIRO, supra 
note 189. 
194 See generally RYAN, TUG OF WAR, supra note 16. 
195 See id. at 181–214, 265–70, 339–670 (discussing what the Balanced Federalism 
model involves). 
[A] series of innovations to bring judicial, legislative, and executive efforts to 
manage [the tug of war] into more fully theorized focus. [Balanced Federalism] 
mediates the tensions within federalism on three separate planes: (1) fostering 
balance among the competing federalism values, (2) leveraging the functional 
capacities of the three branches of government in interpreting federalism, and (3) 
maximizing the wisdom of both state and federal actors in so doing. [This initial 
foray] imagines three successive means of coping with the values tug of war 
within federalism, each experimenting with different degrees of judicial and 
political leadership at different levels of government. Along the way, the analysis 
provides clearer theoretical justification for the ways in which the tug of war is 
already legitimately mediated through various forms of balancing, compromise, 
and negotiation. 
Id. at xi–xii. 
196 See generally id. 
197 See id.; Ryan, Negotiating Federalism and the Structural Constitution, supra note 
146. 
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“zero-sum federalism,” a misunderstanding of state-federal relations 
with roots in dual federalism that continues to haunt the American 
discourse.198 Zero-sum conceptualizations of federalism assume that 
the state and federal governments are locked in an antagonistic, 
winner-takes-all competition for power, in which every victory by one 
side constitutes a loss for the other.199 While this is sometimes 
true,200 closer examination of federalism-sensitive governance reveals 
that the line between state and federal power is just as often a project 
of negotiation, through ongoing processes of consultation and 
coordination that can afford advantages to both sides.201 
Understanding federalism as a project of continual negotiation among 
all levels of government—preserving both regional preferences and 
national commitments—is a critical feature of healthy multilevel 
governance, and one that has helped strengthen the American Union 
against the forces of fragmentation.202 
III 
NATIONHOOD AMID FORCES OF POLITICAL ENTROPY AND GRAVITY 
American federalism has surely helped galvanize the United States 
against further efforts to disassociate,203 but it is also important to 
recognize the limitations of American federalism, and perhaps 
federalism in general, when the pressures toward secession are most 
manifest. Federalism is a useful strategy for good governance in many 
pluralist societies, and an alternative favored over secession by 
 
198 Ryan, Negotiating Federalism and the Structural Constitution, supra note 146, at 
25; see also Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, supra note 134, at 4–5. 
199 Ryan, Negotiating Federalism and the Structural Constitution, supra note 146, at 
25; see also Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, supra note 134, at 4–5. 
200 See, e.g., Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387 (2012) (holding most of a state 
immigration statute preempted by federal law). 
201 See Ryan, Negotiating Federalism and the Structural Constitution, supra note 146, 
at 25; see also Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, supra note 134, at 4–5. 
202 See Alice Kaswan, Cooperative Federalism and Adaptation, in THE LAW AND 
POLICY OF ENVIRONMENTAL FEDERALISM: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 188 (Kalyani 
Robbins ed., 2015); Hannah J. Wiseman, Evolving Energy Federalism: Current 
Allocations of Authority and the Need for Inclusive Governance, in LAW AND POLICY OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL FEDERALISM: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 114 (Kalyani Robbins ed., 
2015). 
203 See, e.g., Cass Sunstein, Constitutionalism and Secession, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 633, 
657 (1991) (“Any society that constitutes its government through a federal system—one 
that embodies a decision to allow for movement among states and to limit the scope of 
national law—necessarily creates a built-in safeguard against political or economic 
oppression,” and accordingly, Sunstein argues, secession.). 
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generally accepted principles of international law204—but it cannot 
solve all problems, nor can it overcome all obstacles. Nor is the 
American model appropriate in all political contexts.  Drawing from 
the U.S. example and that of other federal nations, this Part offers 
observations about the core dynamics with which federal systems 
must contend in any context, and that exert pressure on federal unions 
toward the extremes of further fragmentation or further centralization.  
A. The U.S. Model and the Alternatives 
First, it is important to acknowledge the critical differences 
between federalism in the United States and elsewhere that may limit 
the transferability of lessons from the American experience at all. 
Federalism operates very differently between the United States and, 
say, Europe—because there are very different demands on the 
institution in each place, relating to the substantially greater regional 
diversity that exists in Europe for reasons of history, culture, and 
geography. While there is significant cultural, ethnic, and ideological 
diversity within the United States, it is far less regionally specific than 
it is among the nation states of Europe (and even within some of 
them, such as Belgium, Switzerland, or Spain), where distinct 
regional groups maintain separate languages, religions, and other 
social organizing principles.205 
In the United States, cultural and political diversity within 
individual states can be even greater than it is between separate states, 
so state-based diversity is less likely to cleave along uniform racial, 
ethnic, or linguistic lines.206 In the European Union, and within 
federal European nation-states with regionally distinctive ethnic or 
language subcultures, federalism operates more directly as a 
vindicator of local autonomy among cultural groups that may not 
otherwise be willing to cooperate.207 In facilitating shared governance 
 
204 See In re Secession of Québec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, 222, 292 (Can.). 
205 Cf. Rubin & Feeley, supra note 147; SCHAPIRO, supra note 189 (noting that 
substantial U.S. cultural diversity is much more diffuse than regionally concentrated). 
206 See Rubin & Feeley, supra note 147; see also SCHAPIRO, supra note 189. 
207 See, e.g., Vernon Bogdanor, Forms of Autonomy and the Protection of Minorities, 
126 DAEDALUS 65 (1997) (discussing the persistence of regionally based religious conflict 
in Switzerland until constitutional federalism was used to reconcile differences between 
Protestant and Catholic cantons). Federalism has also been suggested as a means for 
governing Iraq. Renad Mansour, Rethinking Recognition: The Case of Iraqi Kurdistan, 3 
CAMBRIDGE J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1182 (2014). In fact, the Iraqi Kurds have declared a 
“federal region” in the northern third of the country to protect their autonomy. Matt 
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by historically independent populations, federalism does a wholly 
different job in Europe—and even in Canada—than it does in the 
United States, where the differences between the original thirteen 
British colonies were far less meaningful. 
For this reason, observations about American federalism may be 
appropriately limited to its context, and a fuller inquiry would more 
deeply engage other models of devolution in constitutional design. 
These might include models of “asymmetrical federalism,” in which 
different subnational constituents with similar constitutional status are 
granted different powers and degrees of autonomy,208 in contrast to 
the U.S. model of symmetrical federalism, in which all states possess 
equivalent authority in an identical relationship to the national 
government.209 Canada,210 India,211 Russia,212 and several other 
nations with formal federal systems use different varieties of 
asymmetrical federalism, and several unitary nations without formal 
federalism use related systems of devolution, including the United 
Kingdom,213 Spain,214 and Indonesia.215 Importantly, the literature on 
 
Bradley et al., Kurds Declare ‘Federal Region’ in Syria, Says Official, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 
24, 2016, 12:41 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/kurds-declare-federal-region-in-syria    
-says-official-1458216404. However, some suggest that dissolution into regional subunits 
may be preferable. See Tim Arango, Reviving an Old Idea for Iraq Still in Turmoil: 
Splitting it Up, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2016, at A6. 
208 See, e.g., ALIXANDRA FUNK, ASYMMETRICAL FEDERALISM IN THE 
MULTINATIONAL FEDERATION: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF ASYMMETRICAL 
FEDERALISM IN CANADA AND SPAIN (2010); Alain-G. Gagnon, Taking Stock of 
Asymmetrical Federalism in an Era of Exacerbated Centralization, in CONTEMPORARY 
CANADIAN FEDERALISM: FOUNDATIONS, TRADITIONS, INSTITUTIONS (Alain-G. Gagnon 
ed., 2006); R. Michael Stevens, Asymmetrical Federalism: The Federal Principle and the 
Survival of the Small Republic, 7 PUBLIUS 177 (1977). 
209 See Alfred C. Stepan, Federalism and Democracy: Beyond the U.S. Model, 10 J. 
DEMOCRACY 19 (1999). 
210 See Gagnon, supra note 208. 
211 See M. Govinda Rao & Nirvikar Singh, Asymmetric Federalism in India (U.C. 
Santa Cruz, Working Paper No. 04–08, 2004), http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/0v599 
42g.pdf;origin=repeccitec. 
212 See Jorge Martinez-Vazquez, Asymmetric Federalism in Russia: Cure or Poison?, 
in FISCAL FRAGMENTATION IN DECENTRALIZED COUNTRIES: SUBSIDIARITY, SOLIDARITY 
AND ASYMMETRY 227 (Richard M. Byrd & Robert D. Ebel eds., 2007). 
213 See ANDREW BLICK & GEORGE JONES, A FEDERAL FUTURE FOR THE UK: THE 
OPTIONS 7 (2010), http://www.lse.ac.uk/government/Publications/A-Federal-Future-for     
-the-UK.pdf. 
214 See Joan Marc Simon, Federalism and the Future of Spain, FED. UNION (Oct. 5, 
2011), http://www.federalunion.org.uk/federalism-and-the-future-of-spain/. 
215 See Jacques Bertrand, Indonesia’s Quasi-Federalist Approach: Accommodation 
Amid Strong Integrationist Tendencies, 5 INT’L J. CONST. L. 576 (2007). 
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constitutional design in ethnically divided societies would also be of 
great service to this larger project.216  
Even so, some commonalities can be found among pluralist 
societies coping with regional tension, about which the U.S. 
experience remains informative. 
B. The Forces of Fragmentation and Centralization 
Most patent are the forces of fragmentation and centralization that 
are ever-present in pluralist societies, in the United States and beyond. 
When political conflicts become severe, fragmentation can foment 
violent movements for secession, as the United States experienced 
during its Civil War,217 although it can also lead to consensual 
disassociation, as between Norway and Sweden,218 the Czech 
Republic and Slovakia,219 and as may be happening today in 
Belgium.220 At the same time, the counterbalancing forces of political 
interdependence can help hold a union together, or (as some critics 
argue has occurred in the United States) overly consolidate central 
power.221 In each case, federalism must contend with the opposing 
political forces of entropy and gravity. 
 
216 See, e.g., CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN FOR DIVIDED SOCIETIES: INTEGRATION OR 
ACCOMMODATION? (Sujit Choudhry ed., 2008); Donald L. Horowitz, Constitutional 
Design: Proposals Versus Processes, in THE ARCHITECTURE OF DEMOCRACY: 
CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN, CONFLICT MANAGEMENT, AND DEMOCRACY 15 (Andrew 
Reynolds ed., 2002); Donald L. Horowitz, Constitutional Design: An Oxymoron?, 42 
NOMOS 253 (2000). 
217 See supra Part I.B. 
218 Margaret Moore, On National Self-Determination, 45 POL. STUD. 900, 910 (1997) 
(discussing the 1905 secession of Norway from Sweden); Øyvind Østerud, Introduction: 
The Peculiarities of Norway, 28 W. EUR. POL. 705, 706 (2005). But see Glen M.E. Duerr, 
Peaceful and Mutual Parliamentary Dissolution: Dissolved Unions in Sweden-Norway 
(1905) and Czechoslovakia (1993) and Their Lessons for Europe, 35 SPRAWY 
NARODOWOSCIOWE 29, 38 (2009) (noting that Norway’s unilateral declaration of 
independence surprised Sweden, and that “[s]ome Swedish ministers advocated war to 
retain Norway”). 
219 Duerr, supra note 218, at 39 (noting that Czechoslovakia’s disassociation truly was 
a peaceful “[v]elvet [d]ivorce”). 
220 Id. at 32 (discussing the potential disassociation of Belgium); Bogdanor, supra note 
207, at 65 (discussing the potential failure of Belgian federalism to reconcile the 
competing interests of distinct linguistic communities). 
221 See infra note 236 (discussing the Tea Party, Tenther, and New Federalism 
movements). 
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1. Political Entropy: Toward Disassociation 
With regard to those forces that operate to pull polities apart, 
federal unions must endure considerable pressures toward 
disassociation.222 Federalism may strive for that “sweet spot” 
between local autonomy and national interdependence, but it only 
works when there is broad enough agreement on an overarching 
national purpose. In the United States and elsewhere, successful 
federalism hinges on there being enough shared values to support the 
national consensus that a central government is empowered to protect 
against competing local impulses. When the national consensus 
breaks down, so does the legitimacy of enabling centralized 
government to trump local autonomy. 
Drawing from the example of the American Civil War, regional 
conflict fulminated into full-blown rebellion when the consensus 
between northern and southern states broke down over conflicting 
constitutional provisions regarding human rights and slavery. Setting 
aside pressing questions about the morality of the southern position, 
the loss of sufficient national consensus weakened the perceived 
legitimacy of national power among southern secessionists. After all, 
from their perspective, what legitimizes the exercise of national 
power against local autonomy if there is no longer a national 
consensus for it to enforce? For this reason, federal unions must work 
hard against the forces of political entropy that can draw distinctive 
regional subcultures farther and farther apart, pushing for regulatory 
decision-making at the more local or regional level. 
 
222 While the legal literature focuses on whether there are international or domestic 
rights to secession as a legal matter, the political science and moral philosophy literature is 
rich with compelling discussion on whether there are moral rights to secession that flow 
from legitimate political claims for self-determination. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER 
WELLMAN, A THEORY OF SECESSION: THE CASE FOR POLITICAL SELF-DETERMINATION 
(2005); Avishai Margalit & Joseph Raz, National Self-Determination, 87 J. PHIL. 439 
(1990) (setting forth moral justification for a conditional right to self-determination by 
members of an encompassing group); Christopher H. Wellman, A Defense of Secession 
and Political Self-Determination, 24 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 142 (1995) (arguing for a hybrid 
model of political justification for a limited right secession, when its proponents have a 
legitimate claim for self-determination and the resulting new state is able to perform the 
rights-protective functions of government without too much externalized harm); Allen 
Buchanan, Theories of Secession, 26 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 31 (1997) (arguing in favor of 
remedial rights-based justifications for secession over ascriptive or associative group 
rights-based justifications); David Copp, International Law and Morality in the Theory of 
Secession, 2 J. ETHICS 219 (1998) (arguing for a broad right of secession among territorial 
and political societies). But see Sunstein, supra note 203 (arguing against formalizing 
rights of secession within constitutional systems). 
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In extreme cases, however, where regionally-related conflict has 
fractured a nation beyond repair, separation may be the only effective 
remedy—or at least a remedy that seems morally justified.223 As the 
author of one International Court of Justice opinion acknowledged in 
assessing Kosovo’s bid for independence from Serbia, claims for 
secession are especially persuasive in circumstances showing extreme 
oppression, disenfranchisement, or marginalization of a regional 
group within the overall nation.224 
For example, the United States and other world leaders supported 
the secession of South Sudan from the Republic of Sudan in 2011, 
after fifty years of post-colonial civil war and entrenched regional 
conflict over ethnic and religious violence, access to valuable natural 
resources, and political marginalization.225 Tragically, further 
fragmentation along tribal lines continues to fray the new nation even 
after independence, as local militias that formed during the civil wars 
engage in violent competition over political power and oil 
revenues.226 Although oppression by the north was alleviated by its 
secession, South Sudan’s ongoing struggles with poverty and 
corruption are increasingly exacerbated by more local ethnic rivalries 
 
223 See also Buchanan, supra note 222, at 34–38 (arguing that remedial rights-based 
claims for secession are most justifiable, because, consistent with Lockean theory of 
revolution, “[w]hen the people suffer prolonged and serious injustices, the people will 
rise”). Writing in 1997, Professor Buchanan referenced genocidal policies against the 
Kurds in northern Iraq to demonstrate the basis for a remedial right of secession—an 
especially poignant example given failed Kurdish independence referendum that would 
follow twenty years later in 2017. See infra text accompanying notes 239–43 (discussing 
the contemporary secession movement in Iraqi Kurdistan). 
224 Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in 
Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 403, ¶¶ 166–68, 176, 205–08, 217 (July 
22) (separate opinion by Trindade, J.) (summarizing recent atrocities in Kosovo, arguing 
that self-determination becomes a right of severely subjugated peoples, and concluding 
that international respect for territorial integrity is waived by states that practice ethnic 
cleansing). See also Joel Day, Research Paper, The Remedial Right to Succession, 
POTENTIA 19, 20 (2012) (arguing that ICJ precedent understands self-determination as the 
externally recognized self-governance of an “insular, often oppressed, minority” within a 
state and that “the crux of the matter is whether possessing a state is a universal right or if 
groups may only secede in response to human rights violations”). 
225 See Jeffrey Gettleman, Struggle Over, Independent South Sudan Rejoices, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 10, 2011, at A6 (discussing the secession of South Sudan). 
226 See Max Fisher, 9 Questions About South Sudan You Were Too Embarrassed to 
Ask, WASH. POST (Dec. 30, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews 
/wp/2013/12/30/9-questions-about-south-sudan-you-were-too-embarrassed-to-ask/ 
(discussing ongoing ethnic strife in South Sudan). 
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within the new nation227—perhaps lending sad credence to concerns 
that secession can sometimes exacerbate the ethnic conflicts that give 
rise to secession in the first place.228 Governing South Sudan amid 
such extreme fragmentation—or at least protecting its most 
vulnerable people in the meanwhile—remains an urgent international 
challenge.229 
2. Political Gravity: Toward Interconnection 
The forces of political entropy are thus formidable, but opposing 
forces of political gravity operate simultaneously to pull federal 
participants closer and closer together, especially in the present day. 
Federalism nurtures the “sweet spot” between autonomy and 
interdependence, but the forces of interdependence have been 
gathering strength over time.230 Few communities exist in full 
isolation of others now, if they ever did. People migrate, intermarry, 
and interact across cultural and geographical boundaries. Activities 
within one community can cause changes within others. Disparate 
polities help and harm one another by the choices they make, 
purposefully or otherwise. Within federalism, the principle of 
subsidiarity directs that regulatory decisions be taken at the most local 
level possible, but the same rationale preempts fully local 
management of regulatory problems with boundary-crossing or 
“spillover” impacts to neighboring communities, where other local 
governments lack the legal or practical capacity to respond.231 Indeed, 
the list of regulatory issues threatening spillover impacts grows larger 
as the global village grows seemingly smaller. Climate change, 
refugee crises, regional political instability, international markets, the 
 
227 See Jeffrey Gettleman, City of Hope in South Sudan is Now One of Fear, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 11, 2016, at A1 (describing local rivalries). 
228 See, e.g., Buchanan, supra note 222, at 45 (noting that secession can exacerbate the 
ethnic conflicts that led to the secession because when one ethnic minority secedes, that 
often creates new ethnic minorities with new grievances, or reverses prior patters of 
grievances); Sunstein, supra note 203, at 634 (arguing that recognizing rights of secession 
“would increase the risks of ethnic and factional struggle”). 
229 Rick Gladstone, U.N. Peacekeeping Chief Issues Warning on South Sudan, N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 17, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/17/world/africa/south-sudan      
-war.html?_r=0 (“The leader of United Nations’ peacekeeping operations offered a dire 
appraisal of South Sudan on Tuesday, saying the world’s youngest nation is sliding further 
into mayhem with no sign that its antagonists want peace.”). 
230 See RYAN, TUG OF WAR, supra note 16, at 145–80; see also Ryan, Seeking Checks 
and Balance, supra note 134, at 567–95. 
231 See RYAN, TUG OF WAR, supra note 16, at 59–66. 
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Internet, and diseases like Ebola, Zika, and measles all exemplify the 
ways in which we are ever more interconnected. 
The complexity of the modern world—in which we are bound 
together along planes of international public health, multinational 
commercial enterprise, global environmental systems, and 
international corridors of travel and migration—means that there are 
fewer and fewer truly local decisions that can be made without 
boundary-crossing consequences.232 Regional subdivisions within a 
state, let alone nation-states themselves, can hardly make policy in 
these arenas without accounting for the decisions of others, or the 
impacts of their own decisions on others. But if one group’s decisions 
will have meaningful consequences beyond its jurisdictional 
boundaries, what justifies that group’s authority to make decisions for 
others?  
The legitimacy of strong local authority to contradict national 
policy is weakened when the decisions locals wish to make have 
consequences beyond their own jurisdictional boundaries.233 This 
intuition underlies many modern assertions of national authority in 
unions like the United States, where increasing commercial, 
environmental, and health-related sources of national interdependence 
have justified new regulatory reach from the center.234 
C. Suspended Between Autonomy and Interdependence 
The forces of political gravity, pushing for regulatory decision 
making at the central level, can thus mitigate claims for regional 
autonomy at the very same time that the forces of political entropy 
strain against claims for national authority. 
In a healthy federal system—one that has maintained the “sweet 
spot” over time—these forces will operate in opposition, fortifying 
the union against challenges from both extremes. The durability of the 
American union suggests a solid balance—although critics from both 
sides alternatively complain that the American federation either 
 
232 See sources cited supra note 230. 
233 See sources cited supra note 230. 
234 See, e.g., RYAN, TUG OF WAR, supra note 16, at 145–80; Ryan, Environmental 
Federalism, supra note 134. 
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devolves too much authority for efficient national governance235 or 
has centralized beyond acceptable boundaries for local autonomy.236 
Yet even mature unions face threatening disturbances in the federal 
equilibrium, let alone those newly formed. Recent examples in 
Canada, Iraq, Spain, and the United Kingdom demonstrate the 
challenges of maintaining healthy unions amidst these competing 
forces. While federalism has held some nations together against 
regional cleavage, it can act as a double-edged sword in others, with 
the potential to either relieve or exacerbate fragmentation. 
1. Regional Marginalization in Québec and Kurdistan 
The Canadian experience reveals how even an established federal 
union is vulnerable to the forces of fragmentation.  There, the narrow 
failure of a popular referendum for secession in Québec—driven in 
part by allegations of linguistic and cultural marginalization—
prompted the Canadian Supreme Court to analyze the secession issue 
in light of the four implicit principles of the Canadian Constitution: 
democracy, federalism, the rule of law, and the protection of 
minorities.237 
In a 1998 case frequently cited by constitutional scholars 
worldwide, the Court held that according to these principles, a 
territorial referendum could not allow unilateral secession without 
constitutional amendment238—but that a successful referendum 
 
235 See, e.g., sources cited supra note 147. 
236 See, e.g., GREVE, supra note 189; see also RYAN, TUG OF WAR, supra note 16, at 
xviii–xxiii, 89–104 (discussing the contemporary Tea Party and Tenthers movements, 
which critique the over-centralization of American governance and these movements 
within the overall context of the New Federalism revival). 
237 In re Secession of Québec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, 292 (Can.). 
[T]he Constitution is more than a written text. It embraces the entire global 
system of rules and principles which govern the exercise of constitutional 
authority. A superficial reading of selected provisions of the written 
constitutional enactment, without more, may be misleading. It is necessary to 
make a more profound investigation of the underlying principles animating the 
whole of the Constitution, including the principles of federalism, democracy, 
constitutionalism and the rule of law, and respect for minorities. Those principles 
must inform our overall appreciation of the constitutional rights and obligations 
that would come into play in the event that a clear majority of Québecers votes 
on a clear question in favour of secession. 
Id. 
238 Id. at 265. 
The democratic principle identified above would demand that considerable 
weight be given to a clear expression by the people of Québec of their will to 
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would obligate the rest of Canada to engage with the dissenting 
province to negotiate consensual solutions to the sources of 
dissatisfaction.239 The decision left the nuances of such a process for 
political actors to settle.240 Yet in recognizing the need for genuine, 
interjurisdictional negotiation to address the concerns driving 
separatism, the decision represents a sage approach to mediating the 
competing themes of autonomy and interdependence on which strong 
federalism is founded. The failure of the Québec secession movement 
pleased some and disappointed others, but federalism has continued to 
hold strong in Canada since the Supreme Court’s decision, in which 
all sides found respect for their positions. 
It is difficult to predict the course of another combustible secession 
movement that continues to unfold in the semiautonomous Kurdistan 
region of Iraq.  There, the vast majority of voters recently endorsed 
the creation of an independent Kurdish state, in a 2017 referendum 
sponsored by the regional Kurdish government.241 In Iraq, the 
creation of semiautonomous regional federalism has not quelled the 
 
secede from Canada, even though a referendum, in itself and without more, has 
no direct legal effect, and could not in itself bring about unilateral secession. 
Id. 
239 Id. at 266. 
The clear repudiation by the people of Québec of the existing constitutional order 
would confer legitimacy on demands for secession, and place an obligation on 
the other provinces and the federal government to acknowledge and respect that 
expression of democratic will by entering into negotiations and conducting them 
in accordance with the underlying constitutional principles already discussed. 
Id. 
240 Id. at 221–22. 
[I]n the event of demonstrated majority support for Québec secession, the content 
and process of the negotiations will be for the political actors to settle. The 
reconciliation of the various legitimate constitutional interests is necessarily 
committed to the political rather than the judicial realm precisely because that 
reconciliation can only be achieved through the give and take of political 
negotiations. 
Id. 
241 See Martin Chulov, More than 92% of Voters in Iraqi Kurdistan Back 
Independence, GUARDIAN (Sept. 28, 2017, 7:05 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world 
/2017/sep/27/over-92-of-iraqs-kurds-vote-for-independence; Bethan McKernan, Kurdistan 
Referendum Results: 93% of Iraqi Kurds Vote for Independence, Say Reports, 
INDEPENDENT (Sept. 27 2017, 5:33 PM), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world 
/middle-east/kurdistan-referendum-results-vote-yes-iraqi-kurds-independence-iran-syria-a 
7970241.html. Approximately seventy-two percent of 4.5 million registered voters turned 
out for the referendum, held on September 25, 2017, and ninety-two percent voted “yes” in 
answer to the question “Do you want the Kurdistan region and the Kurdistani areas outside 
the administration of the Region to become an independent state?” McKernan, supra. 
RYAN (DO NOT DELETE) 12/14/2017  8:09 PM 
172 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 96, 123 
impulse toward sovereign independence among its Kurdish 
population. This may be because the Kurdish ethnic region extends 
beyond the political borders of Iraq and into neighboring nations, 
such as Turkey, but it may also reflect fresh memory of the genocidal 
oppression of Iraqi Kurds under the Saddam Hussein regime.242 
The independence vote in Iraqi Kurdistan prompted vehement 
condemnation from the Iraqi central government,243 which later sent 
military reinforcement into Kirkuk,244 and it was later rejected as 
unconstitutional by the Iraqi Supreme Federal Court.245 The 
referendum was also condemned by the Turkish government, which 
feared that a Kurdish independence movement would exacerbate 
Kurdish unrest within its own borders.246 
Thus, while federalism can help assuage the forces of political 
entropy, as it appears to have done in Canada, the Kurdish example 
indicates that it may not always defeat them. 
2. Devolution in the United Kingdom and Spain 
Moreover, while federalism provides useful tools for mediating 
these concerns, it may not be effective, or even appropriate, in every 
historical context—especially those giving rise to deep national 
anxiety over regional cohesiveness. 
 
242 See MOHAMMED IHSAN, NATION BUILDING IN KURDISTAN: MEMORY, GENOCIDE, 
AND HUMAN RIGHTS (2016) (analyzing the Kurdish independence movement in light of 
the history of human rights atrocities against Kurds in Iraq). 
243 McKernan, supra note 241; David Zucchino & Margaret Coker, Iraq Escalates 
Dispute with Kurds After a Vote for Independence, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2017, at A13. 
244 Saeed Kamali Dehghan et al., Iraqi Forces Claim Rapid Progress in Operation to 
‘Impose Security’ on Kirkuk, GUARDIAN (Oct. 16, 2017, 9:43 AM), https://www.the 
guardian.com/world/2017/oct/16/iraqi-army-advances-kirkuk-kurds; David Zucchino, 
Iraqis Capture Key Kurdish City with Little Fight, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2017, at A1. A 
month after the referendum, the Iraqi central government ordered the army into Kirkuk to 
“impose security.” Dehghan et al., supra. 
245 On November 6, 2017, Iraq’s Supreme Federal Court ruled that no region or 
province can secede from the country. Iraq Court Rules No Region Can Secede After 
Kurdish Independence Bid, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 6, 2017, 6:03 AM), https://www.nytimes 
.com/reuters/2017/11/06/world/middleeast/06reuters-mideast-crisis-iraq-kurds.html. After 
the failed referendum, the Kurdish regional president resigned his post. Margaret Coker, 
Fallout in Kurds’ Independence Vote Claims Longtime President of Region, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 30, 2017, at A8. 
246 Maher Chmaytelli & Ece Toksabay, Turkey Raises Oil Threat After Iraqi Kurds 
Back Independence, REUTERS (Sept. 28, 2017, 6:06 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article 
/us-mideast-crisis-kurds-referendum/turkey-raises-oil-threat-after-iraqi-kurds-back-inde 
pendence-idUSKCN1C31U8. 
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It is here important to acknowledge the double-edged sword that 
federalism implies under such circumstances. Federalism may provide 
a safety valve that prevents regional tension from overcoming 
national unity, but concern that full-blown federalism could 
dangerously exacerbate fragmentation has led some nations to 
experiment with less formal systems of pseudo-federal devolution. 
For example, Great Britain and Spain, two longstanding European 
nations, are both characterized by strong traditions of regional 
governance without constitutionally formalized dual sovereignty.247 
With only a single source of sovereign authority, these systems are 
not technically federalism, but they represent another approach to 
decentralizing regulatory decision-making in order to balance local 
and national governance in a pluralist society. Scholars have noted 
that decentralized governance offers many of the benefits claimed by 
formal federalism,248 and it may be preferable to fully unitary or 
disaggregated governance where full federalism is a poor fit. 
Perhaps attesting to this, Great Britain allowed the possibility of 
Scottish secession by popular referendum in 2014, but a majority of 
Scottish voters preferred to remain a semiautonomous region within 
the overall British union.249 Of note, the possibility of Scottish 
independence induced the leaders of all three major parties at 
Westminster to promise, ahead of the referendum, to devolve 
additional authority to the Scottish Parliament, signaling the salience 
of the local autonomy issue.250 Exactly which powers will be 
devolved, and whether other British subdivisions should also have 
more say over local laws, are both issues that remain undecided.251 
 
247 Cf. Stephen Tierney, Reframing Sovereignty? Sub-State National Societies and 
Contemporary Challenges to the Nation State, 54 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 161, 169 (2005) 
(“Sub-state forces, including sub-state national societies within plurinational states, have 
in certain cases been able to negotiate degrees of autonomy within the State. The existence 
of federal states is an obvious example of this process; but even in unitary States it has 
been possible for sub-state national societies to secure levels of autonomy, even though in 
unitary States, such as the U.K. and Spain, these measures of self-rule may not have been 
formally entrenched in the State’s constitution.”). 
248 See Rubin & Feeley, supra note 147. 
249 Scottish Referendum: Scotland Votes ‘No’ to Independence, BBC NEWS (Sept. 19, 
2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-scotland-29270441. The vote was 2,001,926 to 
1,617,989 against Scottish secession, or 55.3% “No” to 44.7% “Yes.” Id. 
250 Scottish Independence: Cameron, Miliband and Clegg sign ‘No’ Vote Pledge, BBC 
NEWS (Sept. 16, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-292134 
18. 
251 Devolution: After the Scottish Referendum, UK PARLIAMENT, http://www.parlia 
ment.uk/business/publications/research/scotland-the-referendum-and-independence/devol 
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Complicating matters, however, the British vote to exit the European 
Union has reignited calls for Scottish independence252—and 
potentially even Northern Irish secession from the United 
Kingdom253—as distinctive regional groups navigate how their own 
interests, economies, and identities align with the rest of Europe 
versus the rest of Britain. 
The British example shows that devolution can advance the 
federalism value of enhancing local autonomy without requiring 
formal federalism. Still, mere decentralization cannot protect the 
check-and-balance values associated with local autonomy to the same 
extent as constitutional federalism, with corresponding losses to the 
availability of strong interjurisdictional competition, regulatory 
backstop, and other related benefits of federalism.254 Some pseudo-
federal subdivisions have chafed against these limitations, urging 
even greater powers of self-determination. 
For example, ferocious political conflict has erupted between the 
Spanish central government and regional separatists in the 
autonomous community of Catalonia, whose quest for greater fiscal 
and political autonomy intensified in 2013.255 The Spanish 
Constitutional Court firmly rejected Catalonia’s bid for sovereign 
autonomy in 2014, holding that sovereign authority rests only within 
the central Spanish government,256 and that unilateral secession by 
 
ution-after-the-scottish-referendum/ (last visited Oct. 15, 2017); see also England-Only 
Votes: What Are the Options? BBC NEWS (Feb. 3, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/uk    
-politics-29292721 (discussing possibilities for more local autonomy for England and 
other regions within the U.K.). 
252 Katrin Bennhold, Amid Divisions in U.K. over ‘Brexit,’ Nicola Sturgeon Calls for 
New Referendum on Scottish Independence, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 13, 2017), https://www.ny 
times.com/2017/03/13/world/europe/scotland-referendum-independence.html. But see 
Severin Carrell, Sturgeon Urged to Delay Scottish Independence Vote Until 2020s, 
GUARDIAN (Oct. 7, 2017, 2:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/oct/07 
/sturgeon-urged-to-delay-scottish-independence-vote-until-2020s. 
253 Sinn Fein Wants Vote on Northern Ireland Leaving UK ‘as Soon as Possible,’ 
REUTERS (Mar. 13, 2017, 10:29 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-britain-eu-nire 
land/sinn-fein-wants-vote-on-northern-ireland-leaving-uk-as-soon-as-possible-idUSKBN 
16K28M. 
254 See supra notes 164–170 and accompanying text (discussing the benefits of 
regulatory backstop between opposing centers of sovereign power). 
255 DECLARACÍO DE SOBIRANIA I DEL DRET A DECIDIR DEL POBLE DE CATALUNYANA 
(Jan. 23, 2013), http://premsa.gencat.cat/pres_fsvp/docs/2013/01/23/20/58/033ae0d1-338c 
-45d0-badf-dfdfbe4b0ede.pdf (last visited Mar. 21, 2016). In 2013, the Catalonian Generalitat 
adopted the Declaration of Sovereignty and Right to Decide of the People of Catalonia. Id. 
256 S.T.C., Mar. 25, 2014, (BOE-A-2014-3885, No. 042/2014) (Spain), http://hj.tribunal 
constitucional.es/en/Resolucion/Show/23861 (“Article 1(2) of the Spanish Constitution 
proclaims that ‘national sovereignty belongs to the Spanish people, from whom all State 
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Catalonia would be unconstitutional.257 Catalonia nevertheless held a 
popular referendum later that year, with over eighty percent voting for 
secession—although the low voter turnout of only forty percent 
clouded the significance of the outcome.258 In 2017, a second 
referendum prompted violent clashes between Spanish police and 
Catalonian voters attempting to cast ballots for independence.259 Of 
six million eligible voters, only 2.26 million participated (a voter turn-
out that remained near forty-two percent), but the Catalonian 
government reported that ninety percent voted for secession.260  
The ballot triggered a standoff between the central government in 
Madrid and regional Catalonian leaders that drew worldwide 
attention. When Catalonian governor Charles Puigdemont waffled 
between calls from his political base to formally declare 
independence from Spain and calls from Madrid to affirm the Spanish 
union, the Spanish government took steps to constitutionally revoke 
the autonomous status of Catalonia.261 In late October, Madrid 
invoked Article 155 of the Spanish Constitution and announced plans 
to remove the Catalonian premier, his deputy, and other pro-
secessionist members of the Catalonian parliament from their 
 
powers emanate’ . . . . [a]s in the current constitutional order only the Spanish People are 
sovereign, exclusively and indivisibly, no other subject or State body or any part of the 
people can be endowed with sovereign status by a public power.”). 
257 Id. Because the Spanish Constitution declares that the unity of the regions under it is 
indissoluble, unilateral secession by the people of Catalonia was impossible. Id. (“It may 
therefore be inferred that in the constitutional order an Autonomous Community may not 
unilaterally hold a referendum of self-determination in order to decide on its integration in 
Spain.”). 
258 Patrick Jackson, Catalonia Vote: No Smiles for Spain, BBC NEWS: INSIDE EUROPE 
BLOG (Nov. 10, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-eu-29994633 (reporting on the 
outcome of the referendum). 
259 Raphael Minder & Ellen Barry, Catalonia’s Independence Vote Descends into 
Chaos, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2017, at A1. 
260 Jon Sharman et al., Catalan Independence Referendum: Massive Majority Votes 
‘Yes’, Regional Government Says, INDEPENDENT (Sept. 30, 2017, 4:01 PM), http://www 
.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/catalan-referendum-live-updates-results-polls-spain 
-catalonia-independence-votes-a7975901.html. 
261 See Giles Tremlett, Puigdemont Speech Gives No Clarity on Catalan Independence, 
GUARDIAN (Oct. 10, 2017, 4:58 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/10 
/puigdemonts-speech-provides-no-clarity-on-catalan-independence; Ivanna Vallespín, 
Puigdemont Letter Fails to Provide Clear Answer on Independence Declaration, EL PAÍS 
(Oct. 16, 2017, 12:17 PM), https://elpais.com/elpais/2017/10/16/inenglish/1508138246 
_000760.html. 
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posts.262 Meanwhile, hundreds of thousands of unionists took to the 
streets of Barcelona to protest the Catalonian independence 
movement and pledge their allegiance to a united Spain.263 
Puigdemont fled to Belgium, while the Spanish central government 
sought his extradition to stand trial for rebellion264 and scheduled new 
Catalonian elections for December.265 As this article goes to press, 
Spain is in turmoil, and the future resolution remains unclear. 
D. Secession and the Morality of Inclusion 
The movements for Catalonian and Kurdish independence are 
ongoing, and while it seems unlikely that either will succeed in the 
near term, it seems equally unlikely that either will be fully 
extinguished any time soon. Unfolding simultaneously, the two 
movements have revived international debate over the extent to which 
secession should be an available remedy for resolving regional 
conflict. Moreover, they provide a provocative contrast for assessing 
the legitimacy of differing impetus for secession. 
In both contexts, proponents argue that secession is justified by 
cultural marginalization within the larger nation. Like the Kurds, who 
suffered atrocities during the regime of Saddam Hussein from the 
1980s into the early 2000s, Catalonian culture was repressed during 
the Franco Regime that extended from the late 1930s to the mid 
1970s.266 While the Kurds remain relatively isolated within Iraq, 
however, the opponents of Catalonian secession argue that formerly 
legitimate complaints cultural marginalization under Franco no longer 
 
262 Anabel Díez & Juan José Mateo, Spanish PM Activates Article 155, Stripping 
Powers of Catalan Government, EL PAÍS (Oct. 21, 2017, 3:44 PM), https://elpais.com 
/elpais/2017/10/21/inenglish/1508587023_487115.html. 
263 Tim Lister, Vasco Cotovio, & Angela Dewan, 300,000 Rally Against Catalan 
Independence as Autonomy Stripped, CNN (Oct. 29, 2017, 1:14 PM), http://www.cnn 
.com/2017/10/29/europe/catalonia-independence-spain/index.html. 
264 James Badcock & James Crisp, Deposed Catalan Leader Carles Puigdemont 
Released by Belgian Judge Pending Extradition Decision, Telegraph (Nov. 5, 2017, 11:42 
PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/11/05/deposed-catalan-leader-carles-puig 
demont-turns-police/. 
265 Sam Edwards, Spanish PM, in Catalonia, Calls for Big Turnout at December 
Election, REUTERS (Nov. 12, 2017, 6:25 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-spain      
-politics-catalonia-rajoy/spanish-pm-in-catalonia-calls-for-big-turnout-at-december-elec 
tion-idUSKBN1DC0ND. 
266 See supra note 242 (discussing Kurdish oppression under Saddam Hussein); Omar 
G. Encarnacion, The Ghost of Franco Still Haunts Catalonia, FOREIGN POLICY (Oct. 5, 
2017, 10:13 AM), http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/10/05/sthe-ghost-of-franco-still-haunts       
-catalonia/. 
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apply, and that the modern secession movement is primarily an effort 
to free wealthy Catalonia from financial obligations to the 
economically struggling parts of Spain.267 They argue that in the near 
half-century since Franco’s death in 1975, the Catalan language and 
culture has flourished, and economic ties have deepened.268 Spanish 
unionists insist that Catalonia remain part of a national community 
bound together by ties of cultural, political, and economic 
interdependence. 
If accurate, these calls for national interdependence to override 
Catalonian autonomy situates the Spanish conflict within a larger 
international discourse about the responsibilities of those with means 
towards those with less, especially under conditions of widening 
wealth inequality.269 Similar themes are likely to animate future 
contests between claims for autonomy and interdependence within 
federal unions. They certainly operated in the British “Brexit” 
decision to leave the European Union,270 and may in other unfolding 
conflicts within the European Union and in other European 
nations.271 As the Catalonian conflict exploded in 2017, northern 
Italians in Lombardi and Veneto, Italy’s wealthiest regions, began 
calling for their own independence as well, forthrightly over their 
 
267 See, e.g., Gaspar Pericay Coll, The Reasons Behind Barcelona’s Massive 




269 See, e.g., A Tale of Two Economies, ECONOMIST (May 16, 2015), http://www.econo 
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Europe, Too, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 15, 1996), http://www.nytimes.com/1996/11/15/world 
/north-south-divide-in-italy-a-problem-for-europe-too.html?mcubz=3. 
270 See, e.g., Erlanger, supra note 1 (discussing motivating factors including British 
nationalism, cultural independence, and anti-immigration sentiments); Q&A: What Britain 
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Trouble for E.U., N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2016, at A6 (discussing political tensions that could 
lead the Netherlands to exit the E.U.); Bruno Waterfield, Dutch Would be ‘Better Off’ if 
They Left the Euro, TELEGRAPH (Feb. 6, 2014, 11:05 AM), http://www.telegraph.co 
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frustration at providing economic support to less prosperous regions 
in southern Italy.272 
These examples raise normative questions about the extent that 
secession should be available as a remedy for regional division, 
especially in the absence of extreme marginalization or abuses. 
Scholars have long argued that economic self-interest alone provides 
a weak claim for secession at best, and a morally dubious one at 
worst. For example, Cass Sunstein has argued that “[s]elf-interest is 
usually a controversial grounds for political action at the individual 
level, unless translated into terms that invoke reasons other than self-
interest alone,” adding that “it is all the more difficult to support 
secession of subunits on this ground.”273 
Similarly, Allen Buchanan urges that appeals to both secession and 
federalism can represent a moral regression, rather than moral 
progress, if we fail to acknowledge our reciprocal obligations under 
what he calls “the morality of inclusion.”274 He tempers his 
enthusiasm for federalism as both an alternative to secession and a 
framework for organizing sovereign authority if we fail to recognize 
“that we have substantial obligations not to exclude others from 
membership in political associations simply because doing so would 
best further our own interests.”275 To preserve worthy federal systems 
and pluralist societies threatened by these factors, the approach taken 
by the Canadian Supreme Court—requiring interjurisdictional 
negotiation to meaningfully address shared grievances276—is, at the 
very least, a wise place to begin. 
CONCLUSION: FEDERALISM AS A SWORD AND A SHIELD 
Among comparative constitutional theorists, there are few more 
incendiary topics than the debate over whether secession should be 
more or less readily available. The question of how to govern pluralist 
societies amidst the opposing forces of fragmentation and 
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276 See supra notes 237–238 (discussing In re Secession of Québec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 
217, 232 (Can.)). 
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centralization is equally compelling. Unfolding turmoil in nations as 
disparate as Spain, Iraq, and the United Kingdom, let alone the 
uncertainties facing the European Union, all prompt questions about 
when subcommunities should be forced to stay part of a union they 
wish to leave277—and perhaps even when subcommunities should be 
able to remain part of a union that wishes to relinquish them.278 This 
critical discourse should inspire all of us to think as carefully as 
possible about how best to reconcile the claims for self-determination 
that underlie secession movements with the competing claims for 
regional interdependence that support national unity. 
Claims for secession are especially persuasive in circumstances of 
last resort, where extreme oppression, disenfranchisement, or 
marginalization of a regional group within the overall nation has all 
but extinguished the possibilities for negotiated resolution. Claims for 
preserving national unity are also compelling, especially in 
circumstances where regional departures portend other human rights 
abuses, pose significant spillover effects, or where the proponents of 
secession have benefited economically from a national partnership 
from which the rest of the polity has yet to reap its reward. But when 
secession cannot be justified or is otherwise politically unavailable, 
federalism and other frameworks for decentralization provide 
important tools for managing regional conflict within a pluralist 
society. 
As echoed by the Canadian Supreme Court’s Québec decision, the 
dominant position in international law prefers federalism to secession 
as a means of managing regional conflict (perhaps excepting 
circumstances in which the principles of self-determination are 
grossly violated by colonial exploitation, alien subjugation, or severe 
repression).279 Ideally, federalism provides a means of enhancing 
self-determination and resolving the impulses toward fragmentation 
and political entropy that can pull states apart. Yet in some 
circumstances, federalism poses a paradoxical risk. By providing 
 
277 See, e.g., Donald L. Horowitz, The Cracked Foundations of the Right to Secede, 14 
J. DEMOCRACY 5, 14 (2003) (arguing secession will not reduce conflict, violence, or 
minority oppression as proponents hope, and generally dampens needed efforts toward 
peaceful coexistence in inherently heterogenous polities). 
278 See Joseph Blocher & Mitu Gulati, Forced Secessions, 80 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
215, 219–20 (2017) (discussing whether the same principles of self-determination that 
justify secession would enable one part of a larger union—for example, a former colony—
to remain part of the union even when the rest of the polity would have them go). 
279 In re Secession of Québec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, 232 (Can.). 
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formal political autonomy to constituent groups that enhance their 
identity as a distinct political community, federalism threatens to act 
as a double-edged sword, creating a conduit toward the very claims 
for secession it is designed to prevent. 
In other words, federalism can be both a driver of claims to 
secession as well as a safety valve against them. Had American 
federalism not already identified the southern states as separate 
political communities with a degree of sovereign authority, it would 
likely have been more difficult for them to organize around the target 
of secession during the U.S. Civil War. Federalism preserves, 
encourages, and foments distinctive regional identity—in ways that 
may seem threatening to nations in which regional tension is already 
formidable. It is for this very reason that nations already worried 
about regional conflict, such as the United Kingdom and Spain, have 
been hesitant to adopt fully formalized federal arrangements. Yet the 
Spanish example shows that even non-federal devolution can pose 
similar risks. 
Acknowledging that federalism can operate as both a sword that 
instigates secession conflict and a shield against claims for secession 
raises important questions for the architects of good governance 
moving forward. Under what circumstances will it operate as more a 
sword and more a shield? To be sure, the “sweet spot” that federalism 
enables between claims for autonomy and claims for interdependence 
will be different in each circumstance, hinging on the distinct history, 
geography, culture, and demographics that distinguishes every nation 
on earth—but for the sake of improved governance in the future, can 
lessons of general applicability be coaxed from our present 
experience? 
To this end, future research should continue to query why different 
models of devolved governance—and even different models of formal 
federalism—work best in different contexts. Should the United 
Kingdom retain its informal arrangement of asymmetrical devolution, 
or should it move to a more formal symmetrical or even asymmetrical 
form of federalism? Is there something distinctive about the U.S. and 
Canadian experiences that justifies the different approaches the two 
judicial systems have taken toward secession, in which the U.S. 
courts have foreclosed the option, while the Canadian courts have left 
it a comparatively (if weakly) open possibility? Is one approach likely 
to produce better results over time, or does it hinge entirely on the 
differences between these sibling nations, as closely related as they 
are? 
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Finally, this analysis forces us to confront the meta-level puzzle 
about the degree to which the same pressures that make subnational 
states inadequate units of governance for managing transboundary 
problems also make larger nation-states inadequate governance units 
for yet larger transboundary problems. Wicked conundrums like 
climate change, international refugee crises, and international 
criminal enterprises raise questions about when international 
cooperation is required to deal with large-scale cross-jurisdictional 
problems,280 and how these networks may further undermine national 
power. 
Indeed, many of the same factors that weaken subnational efforts to 
govern transboundary problems render national efforts equally weak 
at governing even bigger transboundary problems, at least when the 
most important issue at hand is the transboundary-ness of the 
problem.281 Transnational treaties, tribunals, trade compacts, and 
other institutions have been created to deal with various economic, 
environmental, public health, immigration, and terrorism-related 
challenges in response to the failure of the old Westphalian 
order282—and many of these have come under criticism for further 
threatening the Westphalian order of distinctive nation-state identify 
and self-determination as a means of achieving lasting peace and 
stability.283 
This dilemma is perhaps best exemplified by the widespread 
grievances underlying the British vote to withdraw from the European 
Union284—in which countless average Britons expressed dismay at 
decisions affecting their daily lives being made by bureaucrats on the 
mainland, for whom they had not voted, and whom they felt did not 
 
280 Cf. Richard J. Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change: Restraining 
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represent them or their interests.285 Even so, countervailing concerns 
press on for more local governance—for example, the Brexit vote led 
to renewed calls for Scottish independence286 and even the possibility 
of Northern Irish secession from Britain—but in reunification with 
the Irish Republic287—and so the dialectic continues to spin. 
In the meanwhile, the American example and others throughout the 
world continue to highlight the role of meaningful multilevel 
governance in mediating these conflicts, even as we work out the 
finer details of the analysis (if for no other reason than lack of a better 
alternative). Effective systems of federalism, and other systems that 
devolve authority to the level with appropriate capacity, cultivate a 
healthfully dynamic regulatory regime in which local, regional, and 
national perspectives are channeled toward decision-making realms in 
which each best contributes to the overall goals of good governance. 
The developed, modern framework offers useful tools for 
understanding earlier chapters in American history, including the 
American Revolution and Civil War, as well as ongoing federalism 
controversies today. Meanwhile, our continual negotiation and 
renegotiation of American federalism forces us to reckon with the 
“morality of inclusion” on an ongoing basis. 
The processes of competition, collaboration, and negotiation by 
which American federalism diffuses regional tension today are among 
its most important features, and they have surely helped galvanize the 
Union against further efforts to disassociate its many moving parts. 
To the extent that other nations face similar challenges, the ongoing 
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American experiment still holds instructional value. And just as 
surely, Americans will continue to learn from the experience of other 
pluralist societies as we continue to seek the evolving and dynamic 
“sweet spot” between meaningful autonomy and healthful 
interdependence. 
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